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ABSTRACT
The question of whom to house and what kind of communities to create in
public housing is an on-going dilemma for policy makers. From the segregationist
practices of the early days to the integrationist approach of the later years of public
housing, strategies to deal with these questions are often formulated in the name of
"the greater good" of the community. In a program such as public housing where
race, income and class are central issues, such strategies are often highly
controversial.
This thesis examines the nature of the controversy that was created by an
income-mixing program proposed in 1983 by the Boston Housing Authority. The
BHA proposed the "Broad Range of Incomes Program" as an economic integration
strategy, arguing that it would create viable communities in its public housing
developments. Because the proposed program limited access to public housing for
the unemployed and those on welfare, it led to heated debates between the BHA and
advocacy groups who argued that it would victimize those most in need of public
housing. While the underlying issue was the question of who among the poor
should live in public housing, the conflict was centered on a symbolic battle
between the "good of the community" and the "rights of individuals."
The analysis in this thesis is not presented to prove whether income-mixing
as a strategy is good or a bad. Instead, it will illustrate the nature of the controversy
behind the conflicting views of the policy makers at the BHA and the advocacy
groups. It will also investigate the reasons why the conflict developed, even though
both sides were claiming to be acting in the best interests of the poor.
Thesis Supervisor: Melvin King
Title: Adjunct Professor
Director, Community Fellows Program
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INTRODUCTION
In 1983, the Boston Housing Authority (BHA) proposed a tenant selection
strategy for its public housing developments called the "Broad Range of Incomes
Program" which was designed to transform the BHA's tenant mix: instead of
being overwhelmingly poor and nonworking people, there was to be a 50/50 mix of
the so-called "working poor" and unemployed welfare recipients. Since over 70%
of BHA's actual tenants and those on the waiting list at the time were welfare
recipients, the new proposal would have given preference to working applicants
over welfare recipients in for assignment of units in the public housing
developments.
The BHA argued that the strategy would be in the best interest of the
public housing program and its tenants in that, among other things, it would
help build socially and economically viable communities in public housing. As
a result of more working people living in public housing, the proponents
argued that the unemployed would have more of a chance to find jobs and that
more politically and socially empowered communities would be created.
Several advocacy groups opposed the proposal arguing that it discriminated
against the unemployed, women and welfare recipients, because it limited
access on the basis of income.
Research Question
This thesis examines the nature of the controversy created by the BHA's
income-mixing proposal. The research question asks why policy makers at the
BHA and people working as advocates for the poor had conflicting views
regarding the income mixing proposal, even though both were claiming to be
acting in the best interest of the poor. Also, what was the nature of the
controversy concerning the income-mixing proposal? In answering these
question, the thesis argues that:
I) Historically, discriminatory practices based on race, class or income
associated with Public Housing Authorities (PHAs) have made advocates
skeptical about strategies initiated by policy makers at the BHA.
II) Contextually, the prevailing political and economic attitudes at the time
of the proposal were unfair. The idea that welfare-dependents were to blame
for remaining in poverty was prevalent in the Reagan administration.
Benefits for the poor were cut drastically. While the administration
restricted public housing as a "safety net" almost entirely for the very poor,
its economic policy drastically reduced subsidized housing stock, thus
increasing the numbers of homeless and poor people. Advocates felt that
this increased poverty and homelessness demanded that public housing be
reserved for the most needy. Policy makers at the BHA believed that during
this time of diminishing political and economic support, the only way to
preserve the public housing program would be to change its image through
the income-mixing program it proposed. On the other hand, the proposal's
inherent discrimination against welfare recipients and the unemployed was
understood by advocates as an extension of the Reagan administration's
attitude toward the poor.
III) While the underlying issue in the controversy was deciding
whom among the poor should live in public housing, the nature of the
controversy was centered on a symbolic battle between the "larger
community need" verses the "rights and needs of certain groups" for
housing. Framed1 from a "community need" perspective, the BHA's
proposal led to the justification of an income-mixing strategy that
limited public housing access to the unemployed and welfare
recipients in the name of a great social good. As a result, advocates
felt it was necessary to protect the rights of certain vulnerable groups
such as welfare-dependents and the homeless. This led to a
controversy focused on a battle between the conflicting frames of
''community needs" and "individual group needs."
The two conflicting perspectives were shaped as much by the political
and economic conditions of the time as they were by the public housing
experience throughout its history. Between the Housing Act of 1937, which
gave birth to the nationally funded public housing program in this country,
and the early fifties, public housing was perceived as "transitional" housing
for those who were considered middle-class but whose economic conditions
1 The definition of framing used in this thesis is one given by Martin Rein and
Donald Schon. They give the following definition: "Framing is.. .a way of selecting,
organizing, interpreting and making sense of a complex reality so as to provide
guideposts for knowing, analyzing, persuading and acting. A frame is a perspective
from which an amorphous, ill-defined problematic situation can be made sense of and
acted upon." See Rein, Martin and Donald A. Schon. Frame-reflective policy discourse.
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Photocopy.
were temporarily affected due to circumstances beyond their immediate
control.
In the fifties, public housing changed from being "transitional"
housing to housing of "last resort" for many poor families displaced by
slum clearance, a program supported by "public housers" in hopes of
getting more sanitary housing for the poor. Many of these people were
housed in large-scale high-rise public housing projects. While these
projects were built to improve efficiency and sanitation, they were criticized
by public housing advocates such as Catherine Bauer who saw them as an
"...extreme form of paternalistic class-segregation built in the name of
modern community planning."2
Skepticism and hostility toward public housing agencies grew as a result
of their discriminatory practices. The civil rights movement, however, provided
the vehicle through which advocates outside of governmental institutions could
successfully challenge the practices of housing agencies.
By the seventies, the majority of tenants in public housing had become the
very poor and those on welfare. Declining revenues from tenants and increasing
operating costs had threatened the financial solvency of Public Housing
Authorities (PHA's). Instead of raising the subsidy level, the law makers at the
time found it more desirable to raise the incomes of public housing residents.
The 1974 legislation, as a result, required Local Housing Authority's (LHA's) to
2 Catherine Bauer, "The Dreary Deadlock of Public Housing" in Federal Housing
Policy and Programs: Past and Present, ed. J. Paul Mitchell (Rutgers: The State
University of New Jersey, 1985), p. 283.
establish "income conscious" tenant assignment criteria in order to prevent
public housing from becoming occupied by the very poor.
Like many public housing developments in the country, Boston's public
housing had reached a crisis stage by the end of the seventies. Bad management
and a lack of municipal services as well as crime, unemployment and poverty
had threatened the program. The BHA as a result was put under a court-
appointed receivership by 1980. Convinced that many of the problems at Boston's
public housing developments stemmed from the concentration of unemployed
and very poor families away from the middle class, the BHA set out to change
that situation through its proposed broad range of incomes program.
The thesis is divided into five parts:
Chapter One looks at the the historical chronology of the public housing
program at the national and local levels.
Chapter Two presents the "Broad Range of Incomes Program" as proposed
by the BHA and examines its implications for the tenant selection process as well
as its anticipated impact on the tenant mix in BHA's developments at the time.
This chapter also analyzes the institutional responses from the U.S. Department
of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), the state's Executive Office of
Community Development (EOCD) and the Mayor's Office. While HUD and
EOCD approved the proposal, the mayor's rejection coupled with opposition by
coalitions of advocacy groups, prevented the proposal from being implemented.
Chapter Three presents the arguments of the the BHA and the advocacy
groups. This chapter looks at the rhetoric used to advance the conflicting views
from both sides.
Chapter Four analyzes the controversy looking at the historical and
contextual forces that informed the conflicting views as well as the symbolic
nature of the controversy that developed. This chapter argues that because of the
controversy's symbolic nature, compromise became impossible. This chapter
also suggests an alternate framing strategy in which a more workable and less
controversial program could have been developed to achieve similar goals. It
argues that if the proposal was framed primarily as an economic integration
program to enable instead of deny access to the unemployed, then groups that
came out against economic integration would have more likely been in support
of it.
CHAPTER ONE:
PUBLIC HOUSING: THE HISTORICAL ECOLOGY
Although public housing has and continues to be associated with people
in the lower end of the social and economic class stratum, it is a misnomer to
assume that it has been a social program established for the sole purpose of
serving those most in need of housing. At different times in its history as a
federally funded program, it has been governed by different rules, both at the
national and local levels, for different purposes. While these rules were often
formulated in the name of a greater good for those living in public housing or
society at large, the primary purposes have often been to stimulate the interests
of the dominant political and/or economic group that controlled the resources
for public housing. As a result, those politically and economically weak have
been victimized at different times by rules or strategies established through the
public housing program in the name of creating better communities. This has
led to skepticism toward the practices of housing agencies and has created the
need for increased involvement of advocacy groups for the housing needs of
certain people such as racial minorities, the homeless, people on welfare and
single mothers.
This chapter gives an overview of the public housing program at the
national and local levels. It traces the changing roles of the program since its
establishment in the early 1930s looking at how it came about and who it
housed at different times in its history. It will first examine the federal
housing program in the last fifty years. At the local level, it will examine the
practices of the Boston Housing Authority from its establishment in 1935 to the
days of the receivership in the early 1980s.
The National Scene
In its early days, the public housing program was established to assist
middle-class and working-class Americans who were temporarily affected by
the Depression. Later, public housing became home for people displaced by
slum clearance who were then housed in large scale, high-rise apartments,
segregated from the rest of society. The civil rights movement challenged the
the discriminatory practices that were prevalent in the public housing
program. As a result, public housing became a tool for economic and/or racial
integration in order to give increased access to better services for those who
were previously discriminated against. As the level of poverty and the number
of people trapped in it grew throughout the seventies and eighties, public
housing became housing of "last resort" for people on welfare, and people who,
by virtue of their race or class, were discriminated against in the private
housing market.
The Early Years
Between the early 1930s and the early 1950s, public housing was home
for the so-called "submerged" middle class whose economic condition was
affected by factors beyond their control, such as the Depression or war. It was
considered "transitional" in that once the economic conditions of these tenants
were stabilized, they would leave public housing and move into private
housing.
Housing as a national problem was first reflected in legislation in the
early 1930s. Both the decline of housing production after World War I and the
collapse of the market in 1929 shaped thinking about housing problems.
Increasing numbers of workers who lost their jobs as a result of the
Depression also lost their homes, and the ability to pay for decent affordable
housing was shattered for many. At the time, two-thirds of American families
were considered inadequately housed while one-third were considered to be
living in substandard housing. Public housing advocates such as Catherine
Bauer argued that public housing must be an essential supplement to private
housing production, which would be needed even during economic abundance,
because low-cost housing could not be maintained in the private market due to
the cost of housing production. 3
The country's dominant political and economic institutions were
against public housing, claiming that it was unnecessary and contradictory to
the American philosophy of "free enterprise." Despite evidence that
demonstrated the inability of private industries to produce low-cost housing,
opponents of public housing had insisted that housing ought to be provided by
the private sector and not the government. Housing starts, for example, had
continuously declined from 937,000 in 1925 to less than 100,000 in 1933. At the
3 Cole, Mary S. "Catherine Bauer and the Public Housing Movement, 1926-1937." Ph.D.
diss., The George Washington University, 1975, p. 8.
same time, the nation's unemployment had reached 15 percent in 1931 and 25
percent by 1933.4
A statistical study conducted by Edith Elmer Wood had come to the same
conclusion: that two-thirds of Americans would not be able to rent or purchase
housing at a price that was profitable to the private industry. She concluded
that without public assistance, a substantial number of Americans would
never be able to afford decent housing. Despite this evidence, President Hoover
and his legislators resisted the use of federal resources to establish housing for
the poor.5
One particular group that felt the pinch was labor unions whose
membership was affected by the Depression. Many union members
became unable to pay for decent housing and most lost what housing they
had. Catherine Bauer, a young housing activist in the 1930s, saw the
potential in the political power of labor unions: their eminent interest in
public housing and their potential political force in helping to build a
counter movement to those opposed to public housing. She organized these
groups into housing activists at the Labor Housing Conference in 1934,
where she was able to sow the seeds of a powerful housing movement
which transformed local labor groups into housing advocacy groups.
These groups became an influential political force in the campaign for
public housing, which eventually became the catalyst for establishing the
first public housing act in 1937.
4 J. Paul Mitchell, "The Historical Context for Housing Policy," in Federal Housing
Policy and Programs: Past and Present, ed. J. Paul Mitchell (New Brunswick: The State
University of New Jersey Press, 1985), pp. 6-7.
5 Cole, Mary S., pp. 7-9.
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However, the strength of big business and its influence on a
conservative Congress had left its mark on the first Housing Act.
In order to pass the bill it was necessary, or felt necessary, to confine
the program to the construction of housing only for those who could
not afford what private enterprise was willing and able to build. Yet
in so far as we can speak of the potential tenants of public housing as
at least an indirect pressure group, influence flowed not from the
destitute, the descendants of the destitute, the children of Five
Pointers, the Negro ghetto dwellers, or the abject poor; it flowed from
the submerged and potential middle class. The ideal housing act,
then,would be one which would accept the new poor and reject the
old poor; it would shut the doors on those with the ability to get
housing privately, but would not open the doors to people on the dole
and likely to stay there... .These were precisely the provisions of the
Federal Housing Act of 1937.6
The Middle Years
The proponents of urban renewal joined forces with the "public housers"
to bring about the Housing Act of 1949. Title I of this Act established slum
clearance programs which eventually displaced large numbers of poor
residents from inner city communities. The Act gave public housing
preference to those displacees who were poor and economically less mobile.
Through the fifties and the sixties, large scale and highly segregated public
housing developments were built to house these people.
While urban renewal was sold as a "greater good" for society in that it
would improve the dismal living conditions of the urban poor by getting rid of
unsanitary living conditions, it was clear from the beginning that urban
renewal was not going to favor the poor. However, although public housing
advocates such as Bauer were opposed to the concept of urban renewal in the
6 Lawrence M. Friedman, Government and Slum Housing: A Century of Frustration
(Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 1968), pp. 105-106.
early thirties, public housing advocates in the 1940s believed that they could tie
slum clearance to the production of low-income housing. Marc Weiss wrote,
"Fortified by this logic, they [public housers] energetically supported urban
renewal and helped lobby it through Congress and state and local legislative
bodies." 7
The "public housers", according to Weiss, became politically
instrumental in passing the Housing Act of 1949, but due to the political and
economic power of bankers and realtors, the Act did not succeed in creating
"decent housing" for the poor. The effect of urban renewal was urban removal
of communities of poor people from the inner cities without adequate
relocation. Instead of creating low-income housing, urban renewal merely
eliminated many of them from the inner cities.
As a result of the 1949 Act, many large-scale high-rise developments
were built so that displaced families from the inner cities could live in
"modern sanitary buildings." However, these developments had their critics
who understood the actual effect and the sometimes deliberate intentions in
creating such projects. Bauer wrote:
Public housing projects tend to be large and highly standardized in
their design. Visually they may be no more monotonous than the
typical suburban tract, but their density makes them seem much
more institutional, like veterans' hospitals or old-fashioned orphan
asylums... .Any charity stigma that attaches to subsidized housing is
thus reinforced. Each project proclaims, visually, that it serves the
"lowest income group."8
7 Marc A. Weiss, "The Origins and Legacy of Urban Renewal," in Federal Housing
Policy and Programs: Past and Present, ed. J. Paul Mitchell (New Brunswick: The State
University of New Jersey, 1985), p. 255.
8 Bauer, pp. 277-278.
Since their inception, these developments have had intrinsic
problems, attributed not only to their location in the most undesirable
areas, poor building design, and bad management, but also to the fact that
they were becoming more like institutional buildings in which large
numbers of poor people were concentrated. The large-scale housing
projects built in the fifties, such as the Pruitt Igot in St. Louis, the Robert
Taylor Homes in Chicago, or Colombia Point in Boston, did not help build
any confidence in programs that housing agencies initiated in the name of
the greater good of the community.
In evaluating large-scale public housing projects, Oscar Newman,
in his book Defensible Space, echoed a sentiment similar to Bauer's when
he stated that "Society may have contributed to the victimization of the
project residents by setting off their dwellings, stigmatizing them with
ugliness, saying with every status symbol available in the architectural
language of our culture, that living here is falling short of the human
state."9
In supporting programs such as the urban renewal program, carried
out as a greater community good, or in being associated with housing the poor
in high-rise warehouses, the public housers in the late 1940s did not enhance
their own reputation among those whom they were supposedly helping.
Regarding their association with urban renewal, Mark Weiss wrote:
Poor people and minorities learned that they could not count on the
paternalism of public housers to save them from the bulldozers.
9 Oscar Newman, Defensible Space: Crime Prevention Through Urban Design, (New
York: Collier Books Press, 1973), p. 12.
Eventually they rioted, organized, and won some rights and benefits
that contributed to urban renewal's demise in the mid-1970s (only to
be reincarnated as Community Development Block Grants and
Urban Development Action Grants). 10
The Later Years
In the sixties and the seventies, desegregation in public housing became
the avowed goal of public housing agencies. The civil rights movement of the
sixties raised optimism among tenants as well as advocates to work toward
housing rights for the poor. A coalition of advocacy groups increased the
demand to respect the civil rights of the poor as well as meet their shelter
needs. The movement also challenged discriminatory practices of housing
agencies at the local levels in which racial and income segregation was
standard practice, as was discrimination against single mothers.
Integration came to be considered "the greater good" and efforts to
accomplish it were made by local housing agencies. However, the effort to
maintain economic and racial integration also meant that people had to be
turned down for housing based on their race or income. Housing agencies, for
example, had devised strategies to prevent the "tipping" effect in order to keep
a certain community racially balanced. In places like New York's Starret City,
such practices meant that black families were denied access to housing, while
units remained vacant until white families were found to take them. Such
practices were challenged by civil rights groups who believed that racial
integration was not to be achieved at the expense of those who have been
victims of discrimination in the segregationist approach of the past.
10 Weiss, p. 255.
By the early 1980s, the overwhelming majority of public housing
residents and those waiting to get in were very poor and on welfare.
Homelessness reached a crisis stage by 1983.11 While the Reagan
administration designated public housing almost solely for the very poor, its
economic policy also drastically reduced subsidized housing stock.12 Policy
makers in PHA's were faced with the dilemma of how to meet the financial
burdens of the authorities in the face of declining resources and increasing
numbers of poor people waiting to be placed in public housing. Facing the
threat of financial insolvency and an increasingly poor tenant population,
PHAs such as the Boston Housing Authority began to consider economic
integration as a means to improve the socioeconomic conditions of the
developments. Advocates for the poor, on the other hand, felt that increasing
poverty and homelessness demanded that public housing be reserved for the
most needy.
The Boston Housing Authority
The BHA was established in 1935 by the Massachusetts legislature and
was one of the earliest local housing authorities to take advantage of the
Housing Act of 1937. The residents of housing developments were almost all
white, two-parent families, with the exception of the Lenox Street project,
1 Ellen L. Bassuk, "The Homeless Problem," in The Welfare Debate, ed. Robert
Emmet Long (New York: The H.W. Wilson Company, 1989), p. 151.
12 See Margery Austin Turner and Raymond J. Struyk, Urban Housing in the 1980s:
Markets and Policies, (Washington D.C.: The Urban Institute Press, 1984), pp. 37-38.
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which was built in an all-black neighborhood. 13 These were mostly people who
were considered stable working people with middle-class values who became
temporarily poor due to the Depression.
Screening Tenants
Until the mid 1950s, reasons for applicant rejection included, according
to Jon Pynoos, who studied the BHA in the 1970s, "unmarried couples, out-of-
wedlock children, unsanitary housekeeping, and obnoxious conduct or
behavior in connection with the processing of an application." 14 Maintaining
stable working-class tenants and avoiding undesirable tenants were the
primary objectives of the managers who conducted the tenant assignment
process.
Political patronage was another endemic problem associated with
BHA's tenant assignment. The structure of the BHA's governing system lent
itself to political patronage: four members of the five-man governing board
were appointed by the mayor and the fifth by the state. "The value of passing
out board appointments to one's friends," according to Pynoos, "was evident in
a political system where the mayor's election was based on a loyal following
and where, as in Massachusetts, board members were well paid."15
13 Richard S. Scobie, Problem Tenants in Public Housing: Who, Where, and Why Are
They? (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975), pp. 34-35.
14 Jon Pynoos, Breaking the Rules: Bureaucracy and Reform in Public Housing (New
York: Plenum Press, 1986), p. 13.
15 Ibid. p. 12.
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Strict screening and political patronage, therefore, helped maintain
stable working-class tenants. Those considered "undesirable" by the BHA
staff and its policy makers were systematically kept out of public housing.
New Tenants
By the early fifties, as a result of the U.S. Housing Act of 1949, a new mix
of tenants had changed the demographics of Boston's public housing
developments. Provisions were made under this act for elderly persons and,
most notably, preference was given to families displaced by slum clearance
and very low-income people. In the name of creating a better living
environment for these people, the "infamous monster projects" such as
Columbia Point, Bromley Park, the Mission Hill Extension, and the South
End's Cathedral Projects were created. 16
While these developments were supposed to create better living
environments for slum dwellers, the result was to the contrary. They soon
became less than desirable living environments with a multitude of problems,
like those facing many similar large-scale public housing developments
nationwide. Only a decade after they were built, for example, Colombia Point
and Bromley Park had already become the most problematic and, according to
May Hipshman who conducted a study of the BHA in 1967, there was a
correlation between project size and the problems associated, at least, with
Colombia Point. 17
16 Scobie, p. 35.
17 May Hipshman, Public Housing at the crossroads: The Boston Public Housing
Authority (Boston: Citizens Housing and Planning Association, 1967), p. 1.
17
Segregating Tenants
Throughout the 1950s and early 1960s, segregation of projects by race
became prevalent as increasingly poor and non-white tenants became the new
settlers in Boston's public housing. Economic growth and the extension of the
federal mortgage program under Title II of the 1949 Act had enabled most of
the middle-class or working-class whites to purchase their own homes. For
the remaining whites who still needed public housing, the BHA staff
implemented strategies for segregating them from the non-white
developments.18
Segregation of tenants in the developments was not only based on race.
According to Pynoos, people considered to be problematic by BHA standards
were segregated from other public housing tenants and concentrated in
certain projects. Citing a report from a January 29, 1963 Boston Globe, he
stated that "in several projects the majority of children were fatherless and
half the families were receiving some sort of welfare aid."19
The segregated developments were maintained with an implicit
assumption that it would be for the benefit of those communities who lived in
public housing. For example, blacks were segregated from whites with the
assumption that blacks would want to live with blacks and whites would want
to live with whites.
18
18 Pynoos, p. 15.
19 Ibid.
Advocacy and Reform
In the sixties, increased numbers of tenant organizations and
coalitions of advocacy groups banned together to challenge the
discriminatory practices and highly restrictive rules for tenant selection.
The civil rights movement provided the vehicle through which outside
advocacy groups could effectively speak for the poor and lower class
citizens. These groups help to establish reforms at the BHA.
The BHA's practices in its public housing developments were
challenged by several advocacy groups, civil right organizations, and newly
formed tenant organizations. Spear-headed by the National Association
for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and the Congress on
Racial Equality (CORE), civil right groups and tenant organization focused
on the segregation practices of the BHA and pressured the city to make
reforms within the authority. In 1963, pressured by this movement, Mayor
Colins appointed Ellis Ash as new administrator to the BHA.
Under Ash, considered to be a progressive and reform minded
administrator, the BHA, in agreement with CORE and NAACP, replaced
most of the old rules for selecting tenants with more equitable and less
restrictive rules.20 Many of the old exclusionary factors, such as those
which kept out "unacceptable" tenants like out-of-wedlock children and
unmarried couples, were scrapped. New rules were established by 1965.
The new exclusionary rules were primarily focused on factors that
could undermine the safety of the public housing community. Excluded
19
20 Hipshman, p. 25.
were applicants who had criminal records, or "whose [family] composition
or behavior constitutes:
A danger to the health, safety, morals of other tenants;
A seriously adverse influence upon sound family and
community life;
A source of danger or damage to the property of the Authority;
A source of danger or damage to the peace and comfort of
other families;
In any other sense, a nuisance." 21
While exclusionary rules focused on those who might pose danger to
tenants and property, inclusionary criteria focused on income and need.
In order to maintain adequate rent revenue, the new rule made a provision
for income-mixing. Based on a $57 per month as a bench mark, which was
the average "break even" monthly rent for the BHA in 1965, tenants were to
be selected with a mix of incomes whose paying abilities were above and
below the bench mark. To maintain the average rent revenue, the mix of
tenants from the two income groups was determined by the mix required
to maintain the average rent per month. 22 From the two income groups,
next priority was given to those with the highest housing need. Housing
need was determined by length of time an applicant had been without
housing, or close to being without a home and whether applicants were in
unsafe or overcrowded housing.2 3
Among applicants with similar incomes and needs, priority was given
to families with large numbers of children. Among families with equal
20
21 Ibid. p. 27.
22 Ibid.
23 Pynoos, p.2 0.
numbers of children, veterans and people displaced by public action were given
priority. When all factors were equal, the family who filed the earliest
application was given priority.24
While these fair and more objective rules were established in the sixties,
rules did not necessarily translate into implementation. Since the authority
was still governed by the five man board, four of whom were appointed by the
mayor, political patronage, although not as much as in the past, still played a
significant role. Furthermore, the staff at the lower level who carried out the
actual tenant selection and assignment task were still maintained by the old
guards. Describing the influence of political patronage on the tenant selection
process, Ash stated:
The actual assignment of tenants to units, or who got what, was done in
the Chairman's office. Vacancies did not go to Tenant Selection but to
the Chairman. When one long-awaited project of 100 or so units was
ready for occupancy, there followed hours upon hours of individual
judgements as to who would get the units during which the wishes of
the Mayor, Council members, certain legislators and each Authority
member had to be satisfied. As a result, the project was not opened up
for two months after it was ready despite the obvious need and the
waiting list.25
Trouble Times and the Need for Receivership
In 1969, under the so-called Brooke amendment, LHA's were
required to restrict rent to be no more than 25% of tenants income. The
25% rent cap and increasingly poorer tenants as as well as continued
mismanagement throughout the 1970s brought the BHA to a crisis stage.
By the end of the seventies, it was in a state of collapse, facing a multitude
21
24 Ibid.
25 Quoted Ibid. p. 21.
of problems that included high vacancy rate, deteriorating physical
conditions of buildings, and high rates of crime and vandalism in the
housing developments. More importantly, the economic conditions of the
authority's 60,000 tenants were in a continuous state of decline.
The BHA's annual tenant income in 1980 was between $3,700 and
$6,700, the lowest per capita income for housing authority tenants in the
country. With part of its revenue for operating cost coming from rent, and
tenant's rent payment capped at 30% by this time, the situation had
threatened the BHA's financial solvency. In most of the developments,
only 20 to 30 percent of tenants had jobs, while the rest were unemployed
and received some form of welfare. Furthermore, increasing numbers of
tenants became single parent families. By 1980, over 75 percent of BHA's
public housing developments were occupied by female headed families.
While the tenant situation had changed considerably, the authority's
management practices had continued to deteriorate. Citing incompetence
and mismanagement on the part of BHA's governing body, the authority
was put under a court ordered receivership in 1979 and, in 1980, Lewis
(Harry) Spence was appointed as the receiver.
Some of the authority's primary objectives soon after the receivership
was to maintain security at the housing developments and increase tenant
screening as well as quick eviction of troublesome tenants. Security was
improved through increased police protection. However, the quick eviction of
troublesome tenants without due process brought into question the civil rights
22
issue. 26 Another objective was to end the concentration of unemployed people
by increasing the percentage of working families who were eligible for public
housing through a new set of tenant selection criteria. To accomplish that
objective, the Authority proposed to implement the "Broad Range of Incomes
Program" as a strategy to transform the BHA's tenant mix from being
overwhelmingly unemployed people to including an equal mix of working and
welfare tenants.
26 See Boston Housing Authority, a case prepared at the John F. Kennedy School of
Government, Harvard University, by Esther Scott, 1983.
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CHAPTER TWO:
THE BROAD RANGE OF INCOMES PROGRAM
This chapter presents the income-mixing program proposed by the
BHA, the implications it would have had for the tenant selection process and
its anticipated impact on BHA's mix of tenant populations in 1984. The
chapter will also discuss the institutional responses from the federal and state
housing agencies, in support of the proposal and responses from the mayor
who rejected it.
Introduction
In 1983, the BHA proposed a tenant selection strategy based on income
for admission to BHA housing. The program would have established, at each
housing development, an equal mix of tenants whose household income was
less than 25 percent of the area median, as defined by HUD, and tenants with
incomes equal to or above 25 percent of the area median, up to the maximum
allowable by HUD for public housing eligibility.2 7
Since federal law required local housing authorities to establish a broad
range of incomes among tenants of public housing developments, the proposal
received immediate approval from HUD. The state housing agency, EOCD,
approved the proposal reluctantly, adding several conditions to assure that the
proposal did not have adverse effects on the very poor. However, mounting
27 In 1984, for example, the upper limit for a family of four to be eligible for Boston's
public housing was $17,700.
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opposition from advocates for the poor and subsequent rejection by the mayor
put and end to the proposal in 1984.
Tenant Selection Process
The tenant selection process established under this proposal used
two income tiers from which families would be selected for assignment in
the housing developments. As Table 1 indicates, families with incomes
less than 25 percent of area median income, adjusted for family size, would
be in Tier I and families with income equal or above 25 percent would be in
Tier II. Most of Boston's public housing tenants, almost 70 percent, and
those on the waiting list at the time had incomes in Tier I. In order to
accomplish the intended goal under the new proposal, more Tier II
applicants and fewer Tier I applicants would have to be allowed in to the
public housing projects.
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Table 1
BROAD RANGE OF INCOMES PROGRAM
Source: Boston Housing Authority
Incomes of Actual and Waiting List Tenants
While the income composition of BHA's tenants might vary from one
development to another, as a whole, the largest percentage of people living
at or applying for each development had incomes below 25 percent of area
median. Table 2 indicates that in some developments, such as Columbia
Point, Fairmount and Gallivan Boulevard, applicants had significantly
lower incomes than the actual tenants. However, at developments where
applicants had higher incomes than actual tenants, such as Mission Hill
or Franklin Hill, the difference was insignificant.
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Persons in
Household Tier I Tier 1I
1 $0-5,400 $5,401 -12,180
2 $0-6,150 $6,151 -13,920
3 $0-6,950 $6,591 - 15,660
4 $0-7,700 $7,701 -17,400
5 $0-8,200 $8,201 -18,488
6 $0-8,650 $8,651 - 19,575
7 $0-9,150 $9,151 -20,663
8 $0 - 9,650 $9,651 - 21,750
Table 2
ACTUAL POPULATION OF, AND APPLICANTS TO, FAMILY DEVELOPMENTS
WITH INCOMES BELOW 25 PERCENT OF AREA MEDIAN;
AND PROPOSED APPLICANT SELECTION RATIOS
Actual Applicant 4
Developments Population 2 Applicants 3 Selection Ratio
Charlestown 63% 68% 2:1
Mission Hill 80% 76% 2:1
Lenox 68% 75% 2:1
Orchard Park 78% 84% 2:1
South End 68% 76% 2:1
East Boston 75% 75% 2:1
Franklin Hill 81% 77% 2:1
Whittier Street 72% 75% 2:1
Washington-Beech 76% 78% (2:1)
Mission Extension 79% 72% 2:1
Columbia Point 71% 94% 2:1
Mary Ellen McCormack 54% 63% 2:1
Old Colony 63% 67% 2:1
West Newton Street 63% 70% 2:1
Rutland Street n.a. 67%
West Broadway 69% 82% 2:1
Camden Street 590/ 70% 2:1
Commonwealth 76% 74% (2:1)
Faneuil 65% 68% 2:1
Fairmount 46% 73% (1:1)
Archdale 78% 78% 2:1
Orient Heights 70% 77% 2:1
Gallivan Boulevard 500/ 70% 1:1
Franklin Field 79% 84% 2:1
South Street 68% 74% (2:1)
All Family Developments 68% 69%
1 The following dollar limits were applied, based upon an area median income
of $30,800 for a family of four, announced by HUD in April 1983:
2 Based on 1982 Tenant Status Review
3 Based on waiting list as of February 14, 1983
4 The first number refers to households with incomes above 25 percent of area median
income (i.e., in Tier 2). The second number refers to households with incomes below 25
percent of area median income (i.e., in Tier 1). Ratios in parentheses indicate develop-
ments at which specific planning may result in different ratios or other variations. In ad-
dition to the developments designated in this manner, Franklin Field and West Broadway
have been the focus of more preliminary discussions regarding tenant selection planning.
Source: Boston Housing Authority
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To accomplish the 50/50 goal in developments where tenants were
mostly below the 25 percent median income, a 2:1 applicant selection ratio
was established: for every one tenant with income in Tier I, two tenants
with incomes in Tier II would be selected. If a given development has close
to 50/50 mix, a 1:1 selection ratio would be used. For example, in
developments such as Gallivan Boulevard and Fairmount (see Table 2)
where the mix was already almost 50/50, a one-to-one tenant selection
would be applied.
Potential Impact on the Tenant Mix Process
Several factors would determine the outcome of the tenant mix
process under the broad range of incomes program. For a given housing
development, its turnover rate and the rehabilitation would determine the
number of available units. This, coupled with the level of incomes of actual
tenants and those applying to the development in question, determine the
outcome of the mix over time.
For example, Table 3, which illustrates the possible impacts of the
income-mixing program, indicates that total anticipated vacancy for
Mission Main in September 1983 was 279 units. Out of these, 186 units
would be rented out to tenants with incomes above 25 percent of area
median under the two-to-one tenant assignment ratio. In two years time,
40 percent of Mission Main tenants would be tenants with incomes above 25
28
percent of area median. However, since there were only 211 new
applicants to that development, an extra 25 tenants would have to be
attracted from elsewhere.
Table 3
EXAMPLES OF THE IMPACT OF 2:1 INCOME MIXING
Tenants, Sept. 1983 New Tenants Tenants After 2 Years(3 No. of Present
Incomes > 25%(') No. w/ Incomes > 25% Applicants
Expected Expected Incomes with Incomes
Development Total % No. Turnover(2) Rehab Total > 25% Total No.( 4) % >25%(5)
Orchard Park 518 22 114 83 293 286 191 721 289 40 68
Mission Main 460 20 92 74 205 279 186 665 265 40 211
Franklin Hill 316 19 60 51 54 105 70 370 122 33 167
M.E. McCormack 1015 46 467 162 - 162 108 1015 510 50 310
Lenox 304 32 97 49 - 49 33 304 116 38 231
Archdale 230 22 51 37 52 89 59 282 103 37 129
Faneuil 253 35 89 40 - 40 27 253 104 41 134
1 Based upon BHA residents, as of 1982, analyzed according to 1983 HUD-determined median area income;
applied to September 1983 occupancy patterns.
2 Assumes eight percent turnover annually for two years.
3 Assumes present occupancy plus programmed vacancy rehab.
4 Assumes that higher income tenants, as of February 1983, also have moved out at an eight percent
rate annually. Thus, adds 84 percent of third column to seventh column.
5 Based upon incomes of applicants as of February 1983, analyzed according to 1983 HUD-determined
median income; applied to September 1983 waiting list.
Source: Boston Housing Authority
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Institutional Responses to the Proposal
Although, in practice, Spence was granted power by the court to take
whatever "actions that are necessary or appropriate,"2 8 he needed approval
from HUD, which provided 80 percent of BHA's funding, and EOCD, which
provided the remaining 20 percent. Furthermore, support from the new mayor
and the city council was crucial politically as well as practically since most of
the support system for public housing came from municipal services. While
Spence received approval from the federal and state agencies, he failed to get
the support of newly elected mayor Raymond Flynn. With mounting opposition
from advocacy groups, most of whom helped his mayoral candidacy, Flynn
was not politically prepared to support a program which they opposed.
U.S. Housing and Urban Development
In a letter to HUD dated October 25, 1983, seeking approval of the BHA's
proposal, Spence explained the income-mixing program for Boston's public
housing developments. His letter stated that what he was attempting to do at
BHA was to implement a program that was in fact required by legislation. He
wrote, "As you know, the United States Housing Act requires housing
authorities to establish tenant selection criteria 'designed to assure that,
within a reasonable period of time, the project will include families with a
broad range of incomes and will avoid concentrations of lower income and
deprived families with serious social problems"' (See Appendix B for content of
letter.)
28 For detailed description of powers of the receiver, refer to Appendix A.
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The proposal received immediate approval by HUD. In a short letter to
the BHA dated December 6, 1983, HUD was very supportive of the program.
(See Appendix C). HUD, in recognition of the financial crisis that the PHAs
faced, had sanctioned income-mixing programs established by PHAs at least
since the 1974 Act..
HUD's role in influencing the tenant selection and assignment process
of LHA's was first established in 1967, only two years after its creation. In
response to the failure of LHA's to desegregate public housing developments,
HUD had established the so-called 1-2-3 plan based on a single waiting list.
Under this plan, the next available unit, regardless of location, would be
assigned to the next eligible applicant on the waiting list. If that applicant
rejected the unit, the applicant would go to the bottom of the waiting list or to
the next available unit at a location with the highest vacancy if there were
vacancies in more than one location. If the applicant were to refuse that unit,
he or she would be eligible for a unit at the location with the next highest
number of vacancies.29
HUD's policy to stop the segregation practices of LHAs had an adverse
effect, as far as LHAs were concerned, on their operating cost. Since many of
the applicants were very low income families, the 1-2-3 plan, in its first-come
first-served approach, would inhibit any LHA attempt to establish tenant
assignment with the "correct income range to keep the project on an even
financial keel."3 o
29 Jayne E. Shister, "The Strategy of Tenant Selection in Cambridge Public Housing,"
Master's thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1976, p. 43.
30 Ibid., p. 45.
By the seventies, HUD had recognized the serious need to address
the problem of public housing being overwhelmingly occupied by the very
poor. Table 4 shows that as median income for the country steadily
increased, the income of public housing tenants as a percentage of U.S.
median continuously dropped. Between 1950 and 1977, tenants' median
income as a percentage of U. S. median had dropped almost by half from
57% to 27%.
Table 4
MEDIAN INCOME OF HOUSEHOLDS RESIDING IN PUBLIC HOUSING
COMPARED WITH MEDIAN INCOME FOR U.S. POPULATION AS A WHOLE,
SELECTED YEARS 1950-1977
Median Income of Public Housing
Public Housing Median Income of Median as % of
Year a Residents b U.S. Population c U.S. Median
1950 $1,888 $3,319 57%
1955 1,844 4,418 42
1960 2,294 5,620 41
1965 2,524 6,957 36
1970 2,501 8,734 29
1975 3,362 11,800 28
1976 3,437 12,686 27
1977 3,691 13,572 27
Source: Housing and Home Finance Agency Annual Reports, 1950-1960;
HUD Annual Reports, 1965: HUD Statistical Yearbook, 1970-1977;
U.S. Statistical Abstract, 1978.
a Public housing figures are for fiscal year, U.S. figures for calendar year. It should be
noted that census definitions of income have changed over time, and that there are
some inconsistencies in the definitions applied by the census and the much looser
data gathering procedures of the public housing system.
b Median income figures for public housing are based on reexamination of
established households and do not include households moving in during the year,
with the exception of the entry for 1970 which comes from data for new households
admitted during the first six months of the year.
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As a result of the increase of low-income tenants, revenue from rents
declined. Quoting from a June 2, 1971 HUD circular entitled "Housing a Cross
Section of Low Income Families in Low Rent Public Housing," Jayne E. Shister
wrote,
HUD was concerned over the "excessively high operating costs and, in
some instances, deplorable deterioration of the environment in which
tenants live. Sharp increases in vandalism and crime, accompanied by
the move-out of families still eligible and in need of public housing, have
resulted in either, or both, high vacancy rates or concentrations of the
lowest income families, many with serious problems.' 3 1
While HUD did not establish or require a specific type of income-related
tenant selection, it had been clear since the early seventies and specifically
since the 1974 Act, that it would sanction income-mixing strategies such as the
one proposed by the BHA. HUD's regulation, according to Jayne E. Shister,
had allowed LHA's to set preferences for those tenants "who ensured the
financial solvency and stability of the [public housing] program." Shister goes
on to state that HUD's regulation had "required LHA to take steps to stimulate
application from wage-earning and two-parent families."3 2
The State's Executive Office of Communities and Development
With HUD's approval in hand, the BHA next approached EOCD for its
approval. However, EOCD had reservations about the proposal, fearing the
adverse effects it might have on welfare recipients, minorities and large
33
31 Ibid., pp. 52-53.
32 Ibid., p. 53.
families. It was also concerned about equity issues for those who had been on a
waiting list for a long time.
To address those issues, the BHA had established criteria that would
give very low-income applicants and welfare recipients priority for the Section
8 subsidy. Families on BHA's waiting list who were in Tier I, for example,
would be given priority for this program and those in Tier II would have
access to the next available public housing unit.
The BHA responded to the concern over the success rate of welfare recipients
and minority groups in finding units in leased housing by presenting evidence
which showed that AFDC recipients did not have difficulty finding units in the
private housing market. In a letter to Langley Keyes, EOCD's Associate
Secretary at the time, John Washek, Assistant to the Receiver, stated that
"... AFDC recipients have a higher success rate than do employed Certificate
holders" in finding units to rent."33
On May 14, 1984, Secretary Amy Anthony wrote to the BHA indicating
EOCD's "conditional" approval of the Broad Range of Incomes Program. The
conditions that were imposed on the BHA were to guarantee that there would
be no adverse effects on low income families and specifically on those on
welfare. The letter stated that:
EOCD had serious concerns about the potential impact of the BHA
proposal. While the "Broad Range of Incomes" program might improve
certain aspects of the public housing developments involved, it is critical
that such a policy not discriminate against very low income applicants
to the BHA, particularly welfare recipients.
33 See Appendix D for letter from BHA with data on the success rates for Section 8
certificate holders.
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The Mayor's Office
The mayor's office rejected Spence's proposal. Largely owing to
opposition by coalitions of advocates for the poor, the mayor was not politically
prepared to accept the proposal.
Stating that he would prefer to see improved employment opportunities
through job-training for the existing tenants, Flynn indicated his opposition to
the proposed tenant mixing program. In explaining his rejection of the
proposal, Mayor Flynn reiterated some of the arguments used by advocacy
groups, particularly those of the homeless advocates, who were opposed to the
proposal. In a letter to EOCD, dated May 29, 1984, Mayor Flynn wrote:
In light of the current housing crisis in the City, particularly as it
impacts low-income residents, I find it difficult to support the proposed
BHA tenant selection policy. As you know, there is a severe housing
shortage in the City, particularly for low-income residents. The current
BHA waiting list of 6,000 eligible families is an indication of the severity
of the problem in the private housing market. (See Appendix F)
During his mayoral candidacy, he had used housing issues to win
support from tenant organizations who were becoming effective political
lobbying forces in the city. By supporting pro-tenant issues such as rent
control and tenants rights, he had gained support from tenants and
organizations that represented them. While both front runners, Mel King and
Flynn, had expressed pro-tenant views and made housing for low-income
families one of their important agendas, endorsements from groups such as
the Massachusetts Tenant Organization had boosted Flynn's candidacy and
helped put him in office. In light of this background, it was politically
impossible for him to support the income-mixing proposal since the issue was
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already hot with demonstrations by housing advocates, and television and
newspaper coverage of the controversial proposal.
The Mayor's rejection and a possible law suite from the Civil Liberties
Union of Massachusetts as well as mounting opposition from coalitions of
advocacy groups finally brought the demise of the Broad Range of Incomes
Program.
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CHAPTER THREE:
THE CONTROVERSY
While the BHA proposed its income-mixing program in the belief that it
was in the best interest of the public housing tenants, it was vehemently
opposed by many advocacy groups for the poor. This chapter presents the
arguments between the proponents of the proposal and those who were
opposed to it.
Proponents' Argument
On April 26, 1984 the Boston Globe published the following editorial
highlighting the merits of the BHA's proposal for the Broad Range of Incomes
Program and echoing the arguments of the program's proponents:
First, an increase in the number of working poor in the projects may
bolster the political constituency for public housing; second, an increase
in the percentage of working poor living in public housing may mean
more male-headed households in the projects and may enhance the
ability of their adult communities to control the teenage boys who
frequently dominate them... .The trade-off involved in the BHA plan - one
that favors [community benefit] over [individual benefit]- does not sit well
in a society steeped in the value of individual rights and liberties.
However, the policy change is a bold and welcome step toward
strengthening the political clout and social stability of public housing
and toward more fully integrating Boston's poorest residents into the life
of the city. 34
Central to the BHA's argument was the conviction that the isolation and
concentration of poor, nonworking families, away from the rest of society, had
created a politically, economically and socially weak tenant constituency in the
34 "Housing Boston's poor", The Boston Globe, April 26, 1984.
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public housing developments. In order to remedy this situation, there were
three key issues that the income-mixing proposal was intended to address:
First, the public housing constituency could be empowered through increased
tenant participation in decentralized tenant organizations. Second, working
families could be brought to be role models as well as to bolster the political
constituency of public housing. Third, though this was not stated explicitly, the
BHA hoped to increase the number of adult males in public housing.
Tenant Empowerment
The argument for tenant empowerment was premised on the belief that
working people are more likely to have organizational skills than nonworking
people. In order to increase tenant participation and create tenant
organizations at each development, proponents of the income-mixing proposal
believed that it was imperative to have more working people in BHA's housing
developments. A semi-annual report to Judge Paul Garrity in August 1982
contained the following explanation regarding the need for strong local tenant
organizations:
The Receivership's interest in helping to build resident capacity
reflects an acknowledgement that management improvements and
capital investment alone may not ensure the long-term
reconstruction of BHA's housing developments; that secure viable
communities are a prerequisite for physical reconstruction; and
such communities can be developed only in partnership with strong,
capable resident bodies.35
35 Quoted in "The Boston Housing Authority," a case study prepared at the Kennedy
School of Government by Esther Scott for C96-83-564, Part B, 1983, p. 30.
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Only through empowered tenants who were able to participate in
decisions that affect their living conditions, proponents argued, the long-term
interests of the public housing program and its community could be realized.
Spence stated that:
The decision to seek to empower yourself by itself implies that you have
already begun to be empowered. You can't make the decision to
empower yourself from nothing. There needed to be a ground on which
an empowerment strategy could be built. That ground needed to be some
small number of persons who had some sense of their empowerment.
This society derives that from work relations. That is where I started.3 6
The BHA had assumed that one of the the key aspects of maintaining
viable communities in public housing was to develop tenant capacity to deal
with issues at the local level. The kinds of tasks envisioned for the local tenant
organizations were different from the traditional tasks of social services such
as crisis intervention and counseling. While such services were part of the
program, the emphasis here was more on creating programs to increase
employment through job training and to train residents in community
organizing skills. The BHA had already started such programs for local tenant
organizations under the receivership. In 1982, for example, the Supportive
Services Program was established to provide funds for tenant task forces to be
used for educational, employment and community organization tasks.
In the effort to create tenant task forces, however, the BHA staff had
discovered that those who showed interest and participated in task force
meetings were mostly working tenants, despite the fact that the projects were
occupied primarily by nonworking tenants. At Franklin Field, one of the
36 Interview with Harry Spence, March 1991.
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projects where tenant organizing efforts were carried out early in the
receivership, Spence stated that it was mostly working tenants who showed an
interest in tenant participation. Two-thirds of the tenants who participated in
meetings at this development, according to Spence, were working tenants, at a
time when only fifteen percent of Franklin Field tenants were working people.
(See Appendix B.)
The increased interest and willingness of working people to participate
in tenant organizations was attributed by BHA staff to experience gained at the
work place. This view was based on the premise that at the work place, people
are engaged in collective activities that enhance their organizational abilities.
Therefore, increased presence of working people in the public housing
developments was preferred by the BHA who argued that it would enhance the
organizational capacity of tenants and eventually lead to their empowerment.
Working People as Role Models
Many of the BHA's tenants at the time of the receivership were, as they
are today, unemployed. That situation, the BHA argued, contributed to the
isolation of residents resulting in their withdrawal from the rest of society, and
an fostered an ambivalence toward job finding and self-improvement.
Requesting HUD's approval for its income-mixing proposal in a letter dated
October 25, 1983, the BHA explained the effects of concentrating large numbers
of unemployed people in public housing as follows:
In Boston, a number of family public housing projects are occupied
almost solely by the very poor. Residents of these developments are
almost totally isolated from others in our society whose opportunities
and outlook give them reasonable hopes and prospects for the future.
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This situation reduces the chances that residents, particularly
teenagers and young adults, will acquire the attitudes and opportunities
to become successful. In addition, some of the common by-products of a
lack of purpose for the present or hope for the future, notably additional
crime, disorder, vandalism and disinterest in property conditions,
clearly have contributed to deterioration at BHA developments and thus
to the need for the receivership. (Appendix B)
The lack of working role models was seen by the BHA staff as
detrimental to teenagers and to the growing experience of children in public
housing. Rod Solomon, lawyer in the legal department of the BHA and a
member of the authority's staff during the receivership, stated that "It was a
good goal to have teenagers and kids growing up some place where there are
more people around that are going to work, and living [their] lives like the rest
of America's communities live."37 Acknowledging that there were indeed
working role models in the housing developments, he argued that "since a
large majority of the tenants were not working, we believed it would certainly
help to increase the numbers of those who worked in public housing."
Increasing the Numbers of Adult Males
Although not explicit, one of the unspoken goals the BHA wanted to
achieve by bringing more working people into public housing was to have
more male-headed households. Most of these developments had a high ratio of
minors to adults and a disproportionately high number of female-headed
households. The rational for increasing the number of adult males was the
belief that vandalism and crime committed by teenagers would be reduced as a
result of fear of the physical strength of adult males: "... an increase in the
37 Interview with Rod Solomon, March 28, 1991.
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percentage of working poor living in public housing" stated a Boston Globe
editorial, "may mean more male-headed households in the projects and may
enhance the ability of their adult communities to control the teenage boys who
frequently dominate them."38
Spence had also argued that, while a few women may have "the force of
character" or the "physical force" to control teenagers in the public housing
projects, most of the time that was not the case in many of BHA's
developments. He stated that:
They're [male teenagers] more brutal than any other part of humanity--
that's why they fight all the wars in the world, or sent to fight them; it's
a particularly brutal time. ...You get the rare woman who has either the
force of character or in some cases the physical force, to drive ten stoned,
drunk teenagers out. But in nine cases out of ten, it's got to be somebody
bigger and stronger.39
Opposition from Advocates for the Poor
A number of advocates for the poor, along with Tenants United for
Public Housing, staged a large demonstration on April 24, 1984, outside the
BHA's office in opposition of the income-mixing proposal. In the following
weeks, opposition from welfare advocates, women's advocates and advocates
for the homeless continued to grow.
The advocates' argument against the proposal was premised on the
belief that: first, the proposal was based on demeaning assumptions about the
poor, second that it would only reinforce stereotyping and third, and more
38 Editorial in the Boston Globe, April 26, 1984.
39 "The Boston Housing Authority: The Receivership," Kennedy School of Government
Case Study, 1985.
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importantly, that public housing should be for the most needy and not for
designing ideal communities at a time of scarcity.
Demeaning Assumptions about the Poor
The view that "nonworkingness" leads to the isolation of the poor from
the rest of society drew harsh criticism from several advocates. While it was
because of their poverty that they lived in public housing projects, advocates
argued that public housing residents are not necessarily isolated from the rest
of society. They noted that public housing residents vote, read newspapers,
send their children to school, and engage in economic activities.
In response to a Boston Globe editorial regarding the BHA's income-
mix proposal, the Coalition For Basic Human Needs wrote:
Because someone is on welfare, are they no longer in contact with
the real world? With 9-10% of all Boston's residents living in public
Housing Projects, we find the comment that Housing projects are
isolated from "wider" society is not only classist, but an attack on
the neighborhoods and communities in which we live. Income
determines the choices we have. Poverty leaves us with very few,
but it certainly doesn't mean that we are not in routine contact
with "society." We are an integral part of this society; working by
trying to raise our children like everyone else. 40
Writing for the Boston Globe Editorial, Monica Hileman, coordinator
of the Boston Chapter of the Massachusetts Coalition for the Homeless at
the time stated:
Underlying the BHA move to thin out the number of welfare recipients
in public housing are belittling assumptions about women and the poor:
40 Response to The Boston Globe Editorial from the Coalition , April .
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that what women do in the home is not valuable, that it is not "work";
and that the poor are responsible for their poverty. 41
Stereotyping of Women
The idea that adult males would help control vandalism and crime
committed by male teenagers in the public housing projects brought criticism
from the advocate groups, especially those concerned with women's issues.
They argued that the "male role model" view suggested that women in public
housing are incapable of controlling their own children. Noting that services
like job training, employment opportunities and day-care centers were what
were needed in these developments, they argued that the income-mixing
strategy ignored the real problems of increasing unemployment and poverty
that resulted from the insensitive policies of the federal government. The
Coalition for Basic Human Needs wrote:
To suggest that more men in public housing projects will control
teenage boys is not only sexist, but ignores the economic factors which
leave many poor teenagers unemployed all over the city. By implying
that more "male-headed households" will be able to better control our
families, suggests that women are inherently incapable of taking care of
their own families. 4 2
Housing for the Most Needy
The argument for maintaining housing for the most needy grew out of
the conditions in which the poor were increasing while government assistance
was decreasing. Advocates for the poor, particularly homeless advocates,
argued that at a time when federal assistance in the provision of public
housing was diminishing and homelessness was becoming a crisis, public
41 "Wrong way to select tenants", The Boston Globe, April 26, 1984.
42 Ibid.
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housing should remain as a last resort for those who are most in need. They
argued that because welfare recipients and large families were discriminated
against in private market housing, public housing was the only choice they
had left.
Advocates of the homeless are particularly concerned that the
proposed change in tenant selection not be approved. Over the past few
years, the number of homeless families has been increasing at a
disturbing rate. Shelter operators and advocates for the homeless view
the growth of the "shelter industry" with unease. "We're becoming the
public housing for the poor," remarked one person who works in a
shelter.
A recent report, 'More than Shelter: A Community Response to
Homelessness,' tells of people being trapped in shelters because of a
situation in which 'landlords make no secret of the fact that they choose
only 'appropriate' tenants and that the 'inappropriate' include women
receiving AFDC, black or Hispanic families, and often, any family
including young children."
Much needs to be done to improve the quality of life in Boston's
projects. Yet discrimination cannot be tolerated in the private
market, and certainly should not be instituted in the public one.
People on public assistance need more access to public housing, not
less. 43
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CHAPTER FOUR:
ANALYSIS: FORCES THAT SHAPED THE NATURE
OF THE CONTROVERSY
This chapter analyzes the different forces that shaped the views of
the BHA and the advocacy groups, as well as the nature of the controversy
regarding the broad range of incomes proposal.
First, the chapter analyzes the different views on the question of who
should live in public housing. The BHA's view was that public housing
should not be housing of last resort; thus it proposed to integrate the
working poor with the largely unemployed tenants in its public housing
developments. The advocates view was that public housing should be
reserved for the neediest because they had limited choice in private
housing. Both the historical background of the public housing program
and the political and economic context of the 1980s are discussed as they
relate to the shaping of these different perspectives.
Second, the chapter analyzes the implicit frames through which the
debates between the BHA and the advocacy groups were played out. This
section argues that the implicit framing of the BHA's proposal in the
"community needs" frame led to a solution that justified the limitation of
access to public housing for certain groups such as the unemployed and
welfare dependents. As a result, a controversy was created that was played out
in a symbolic battle between the issues of "community needs" and "individual
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group needs" for publicly assisted housing. Because of the symbolic nature of
the conflict and its emotional tone, the chance for a compromise was eroded.
Finally, the chapter suggests an alternate frame in which a less
controversial program could have succeeded along the same lines as the
BHA's goal. A program based in this frame would have the primary objective
of providing increased access and choice for the unemployed and welfare
dependents to move into leased housing. Such a program could have gathered
support both from tenants and advocacy groups.
Who Should Live in Public Housing?
The question underlying the income-mixing proposal was: the
question of who among the poor should live in public housing? Should it be
the "working poor," who were considered to be less troublesome and were
as much in need of housing as the very poor? Or should it be the so-called
"undeserving poor" who were welfare dependent and very poor? In the
face of declining resources and increasing poverty and homelessness, the
advocates argued that public housing should be reserved for the most
needy.
These conflicting views between the BHA and the advocacy groups
were shaped both by the historical background of the public housing
program and by the political and economic conditions of the 1980s.
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Historical Aspects
Historically, the tradition of advocacy in housing is primarily built on
protecting the needs and rights of certain groups of people considered to be the
most in need of shelter. By virtue of their race, income or class, these groups
have been discriminated against by the dominant political, social or economic
group. In their bid to assure equal access to public housing and eliminate
practices that deny access to such groups of people, advocates have actively
challenged both the local and the national practices of PHAs since the 1960s.
The advocacy tradition that challenged discrimination and segregation
in public housing was posited on two views: people should not be denied access
on the basis of race, class or income, and public housing should be for the most
needy. The advocacy groups' reaction toward the BHA's proposal was based
mostly on their belief that the program denied access to the unemployed or
single mothers on the basis of their income or class. It was also based on the
belief that these people should have priority in public housing because they
faced discrimination in private housing.
Since public housing became increasingly occupied by poorer
tenants beginning in the 1950s, PHAs were faced with both financial
problems in their operating budgets and security problems in their
housing developments. Poorer tenants and a subsequent decline in rent
revenue, coupled with insufficient federal assistance, exacerbated the weak
financial conditions of PHAs. Increased vandalism and crime, as well as
increasing levels of poverty, had undermined the socioeconomic conditions
of public housing residents. While some analysts attributed these
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conditions to the practices and programs of local and federal housing
authorities, others have attributed them to the concentration of very poor
and lower class people in public housing. 44 It stands to reason that
because the BHA believed that the concentration of the very poor was the
cause for the deteriorating socioeconomic conditions, they would seek to
eliminate the concentration by designing a program that favored the
working poor over the unemployed.
While race, income and class remained central issues in the
development of any public housing program, the need to shape the
character of public housing communities had become an important aspect
in determining who would be housed in public housing. Since the sixties,
the need to integrate public housing racially and/or by income had become
an increasingly important issue for PHAs. In this sense, the question of
who among the poor should live in public housing was not only a question
of equity, but also a question about the character of the communities that
were shaped by policy makers.
The Political and Economic Context
The early 1980s marked the beginning of a conservative political
period that was less sensitive to the poor. Soon after Reagan took office in
1981, the welfare system, particularly the public housing program was
under threat. While designating the existing public housing stock as a
44 Pynoos, pp. 190-191.
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"safety net" to the "most needy," the federal government moved away from
providing any additional public housing.
Diminishing Subsidized Housing Stock
In 1981, the Reagan administration's policy for assisted housing
required that public housing units be allocated almost entirely to families
with household incomes below 50% of area median income. 4 5 At the same
time, the government reduced its commitment to providing subsidized
housing stock, favoring rather the use of existing stock. Table 5 illustrates
the trend in assisted housing stock between 1977 and 1984. As the figures in
the table indicate, between 1980 and 1983, there was a drastic decrease in
subsidized housing stock immediately following Reagan's first term in
office.
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45 Turner and Struyk, p. 38.
ADMINISTERED
Table 5
TRENDS IN ASSISTED HOUSING PROGRAMS
BY THE DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT
Net Incremental Percentage New Construction
Fiscal Year Units a (In Thousands) and Substantial Rehabilitation
1977 388 52
1978 326 55
1979 325 61
1980 187 63
1981 177 43
1982 52 12
1983 50 C
1984b 89 5
Source: R. Struyk, N. Mayer, and J. Tuccillo, Federal Housing Policy at Reagan's Mid-
Term (Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute Press, 1983), tables 1 and 11.
a Net incremental units is the gross number of incremental units to be assisted, less
conversions of units from one program to another and the cancellation or deobligation of
units for which funds were appropriated in prior years.
b Estimated.
c Percentage new construction and substantial rehabilitation is negative owing to
deobligations.
Source: M.Austin Turner and Raymond J. Struyk, Urban Housing in the 1980s: Markets and
Policies, (Washington D.C.: The Urban Institute Press, 1984), table 13.
While the advocacy groups felt that this trend in housing policy
warranted the allocation of public housing solely for the most needy, the
BHA had different thoughts. Regarding the position taken by the BHA's
policy makers at the time, Pynoos, wrote:
... faced with limited ability to improve environmental conditions in
public housing, let alone do much about the underlying conditions of
poverty that contributed to the problems, many found themselves
retreating from the stance that public housing should be the housing
of last resort. Instead, given the government's movement away from
from providing additional new public housing units, their pragmatic
approach became one of trying to preserve the existing public
housing stock for low-income people. 46
46 Pynoos, p. 191.
The thinking of the BHA's policy makers at the time was that the threat
to public housing came not only from the federal government but also from the
general public. In order to gain support from the larger public, the BHA
believed that the image of public housing had to be improved. Through the
economic integration program it proposed, the BHA believed it would would
not only create viable communities in the existing public housing
developments, but by improving its image, it hoped to gather support for
building public housing in the future. Spence recalled:
The only hope of building more was to link those communities to the
larger community in the way that would satisfy people inside and
outside the community and hope to restore some confidence. I believed
that if we created such communities, they would be very healthy and
vital communities and that the larger public would be in favor of
building more public housing."4 7
Unfair Policies Regarding the Poor
The prevailing thought among the conservative politicians who came
into power in the 1980s was that the poor were at the bottom of the economic
heap as a result of their own actions. The Reagan administration, for the
most part, blamed those in poverty, including welfare dependents and the
unemployed, for being in that condition. In the 1980s, many conservatives
believed that welfare programs such as AFDC encouraged out-of-wedlock
childbearing and that welfare in general encouraged the poor not to work.48
Describing the prevailing sentiment of the early 1980s toward welfare
dependants and the homeless, Robert Emmet Long wrote: "President
47 Interview with Harry Spence, March, 1991.
48 Susan B. Garland, "Welfare Reform May Finally Be in the Works," in The
Welfare Debate, p. 61.
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Reagan's attitude toward those on welfare was at best unsympathetic; he
spoke of 'welfare queens' who arrived in Cadillacs to pick up their welfare
checks, and referred to the homeless as 'homeless, you might say, by
choice."'49
Under Reagan, the federal government was "unsympathetic" toward
the poor not only in its attitude but also in its economic policies. For
example, in its 1982 budget it slashed spending for AFDC programs by
11.2%. Some 450,000 families lost AFDC benefits as a result of strict
limitations on the level of income to be eligible. Furthermore, 1 million
families lost food-stamp benefits while over half a million children lost
medical benefits. Combined spending for the poor by 1984 had dropped by
7% from what it was in 1981.50
Homelessness
The number of people who became homeless in 1983 was considered
by some to be the highest "at any time since the Great Depression." The
homeless population increased by 500,000 in the one year between 1982 and
1983, according to the National Coalition for the Homeless, which put the
figure at 2.5 million for 1983. HUD's estimate of between 250,000 and 350,000
for the same period was less than the Coalition's. While it was difficult to
49 Robert Emmet Long, "Background: Welfare and the Reagan Presidency,"
in The Welfare Debate, p. 7.
50 Lawrence D. Maloney, "Welfare in America: Is It a Flop?," in The Welfare Debate,
p. 18.
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determine the actual number, homelessness was nevertheless recognized
as a national crisis by the early 1980s. 51
While homelessness was being recognized as a crisis and the
subsidized housing stock was diminishing, the price of low-income housing
had skyrocketed. In an article for the Yale Review, Jonathan Kozol argued
that the shortage of low-income housing was the major cause of increased
homelessness in the eighties. In just two years, between 1978 and 1980,
Kozol reported, there was a 30% increase in the median rent to those with
the lowest income, which, he argued, had put many people out on the street.
"In Boston," he stated, "between 1982 and 1984, over eighty Local Housing
Authority's (LHA) of the housing units renting below three hundred dollars
disappeared, while the number of units renting above six hundred dollars
nearly tripled."5 2
Summary
In light of the political and economic climate that was unfair in its
attitude as well as its economic policy toward the poor, it was not
surprising that welfare advocates, advocates for the homeless and
women's rights advocates were vehemently opposed to the BHA's income-
mixing proposal. For them, one message came out loud and clear from the
proposal's inherent preference for the working poor over non-working
people, or for two-parent families over female-headed families. This was
51 Ellen L. Bassuk, "The Homeless Problem," in The Welfare Debate, pp. 151-152.
52 Jonathan Kozol, "Distancing the Homeless", in The Welfare Debate, p. 162.
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the message that echoed the prevailing sentiments of the Reagan
administration toward the poor. "What a condescending attitude that
was," recalled Maryann Martorana, Vice President of the Massachusetts
Tenants Organization (MTO), a housing advocate who actively opposed the
proposal in 1984, referring to the BHA's argument that the unemployed
would be able to find jobs as a result of integration with working people.
"That assumed," she went on, that "people who lived in public housing
were stupid and lazy. It was part of all those stereotypes that the larger
society was putting on poor people; they don't want to work, they don't know
how to work, etc."53
In a political climate where issues about the very poor and the
homeless were taking center stage, BHA's proposed income-mixing
program was not acceptable to the advocacy groups because of its perceived
unfairness to the poor. They could support a program that would limit
access to lower class families in the name of some larger community goal,
even though the proposed program would still serve very poor people; if not
on substantive grounds, it had to be opposed on symbolic grounds.
Conflicting Frames as Cause to an Irreconcilable Controversy
The Community Needs Frame
In arguing for the economic integration program, the BHA
premised its proposal on the belief that the public housing tenants had
problems as a community. The BHA saw its stated objective--to create
53 Interview with Maryann Martorana, Vice President of the Massachusetts Tenants
Organization (MTO), April, 1991.
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viable communities in the public housing developments--as meeting the
needs of the larger community. As such, its arguments were organized
under a "community needs" frame.
Six years after the BHA's receivership ended, on March 8, 1991 Spence
reminisced about the BHA's proposal for the Broad Range of Incomes
Program.
When you have an institutional responsibility, you often represent the
communal interest... .as an advocate your task in many ways is to
represent the individual interest. My own belief is that there is no
salivation without community. I believe that if we create such
communities they will be very healthy and vital communities and that
the larger public will be in favor of building more public housing.54
Once the BHA's proposed solution was implicitly framed in the
"community needs" perspective, the issue of equity and fairness became
secondary to the issue of community needs. Despite the proposal's
inherent inequity, the action became justified when viewed through this
frame; the community need took precedence over the needs of any single
group of people. Therefore, the solution that was born of this frame was
primarily based on limiting people's access to public housing based on
their income or class, for the sake of greater social good.
In a program such as public housing where issues of race, income
and class are central, and at a time when the very poor were politically and
economically vulnerable, one predominant message was heard out of the
"community needs" frame: "certain groups of people are being denied
access because of their income or class." Primarily for this reason, many
54 Interview with Harry Spence, March , 1991.
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tenants and the advocacy groups who represented their interests reacted
immediately to oppose the proposal. Thus, an irreconcilable controversy
was created that was debated more on symbolic grounds than it was on
substantive issues.
The Individual Group Needs Frame
In opposing the income-mixing proposal, the advocacy groups'
arguments became organized under the "individual group needs" frame.
The advocacy groups spoke of the need for public housing among welfare
recipients, the homeless, single mothers and AFDC recipients. In the
implicit frame of reference, advocacy groups put the needs of welfare
recipients, single mothers and the homeless ahead of a program that the
BHA viewed as meeting a larger community need. This created a
controversy, the tone of which was set in a symbolic battle between the
"community need" and the "needs of individual groups" for a publicly
funded program. Once the controversy took this symbolic nature and
became wedged in emotional arguments, the chance for compromise was
eroded.
Symbolic Conflict
The symbolic nature of the controversy was reflected in the rhetoric that
the BHA and the advocacy groups used either to persuade their audiences or to
defend or advance their positions. The BHA, for example, used phrases such
as "tenant empowerment," "isolation of the poor," "viable communities" and
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"role models" as symbolic, persuasive tools to represent abstract ideas. All
these phrases infer or reinforce the "community needs" perspective in which
the BHA's income-mixing proposal was implicitly framed. Similarly, to
advance their "individual group needs" frame, the advocacy groups used
phrases such as "demeaning assumptions," "stereotyping," "blaming the
victim," and the "most needy"--to symbolically represent groups of people with
certain needs.
The symbolic nature of the controversy was also reflected as each side
used the same evidence to support their conflicting views. This was best
exemplified in the debate over the success rate of Section 8 programs.
Advocacy groups opposed the BHA's Section 8 subsidy as a supplement to
reduce the adverse effect of the income-mixing proposal on the grounds that
discrimination in private housing would make them useless for families
such as AFDC recipients or black and Hispanic applicants. The BHA,
arguing that in fact these groups had the same or better success rates
compared to total applicants, used the data in Table 6 as evidence. This was
contained in a letter from the BHA to the EOCD. (See Appendix D)
To determine the success rates of applicants who were able to find
units, the BHA used the percentage of certificate holders by race and
source of income. As Table 6 indicates, while total success rate for Section
8 certificate holders was 59%, Hispanic certificate holders had the highest
success rate at 62%, followed by black certificate holders who had a 59%
success rate and whites at 56%.
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Table 6
DISTRIBUTION OF SECTION 8 CERTIFICATE HOLDERS
BY RACE AND INCOME SOURCE
(SUCCESS RATES ARE INDICATED IN PARENTHESES)
Income Source White Black Hispanic Other Total
AFDC 340 1659 457 20 2476
(64%) (59%) (65%) (35%) (61%)
Employed 159 947 121 51 1278
(52%) (58%) (60%) (37%) (56%)
Soc.Sec./Retired 350 110 12 12 484
(50%) (56%) (33%) (67%) (52%)
SSI 103 72 28 2 205
(42%) (43%) (64%) (50%) (45%)
General Relief 24 70 14 2 110
(42%) (69%) (43%) (50%) (59%)
Multi Source 451 473 124 20 1068
(57%) (54%) (61%) (45%) (56%)
Other 41 181 12 2 236
(71%) (86%) (50%) (100%) (82%)
Total 1468 3512 768 109 5857
(56%) (59%) (62%) (43%) (59%)
Source: Boston Housing Authority
In response to the BHA's claim about the Section 8 success rate,
advocacy groups used the same data to point out its failure rate. In a letter
dated May 29, 1984, Sue Marsh, a housing advocate from Family Services of
Greater Boston, wrote to the BHA arguing that black and Hispanic AFDC
recipients had a high failure rate in finding housing through the Section 8
program. She wrote:
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I have looked at Mr. Washek's data in terms of the number of
unsuccessful AFDC recipients, particularly those who are black and
Hispanic. According to Mr. Washek's figures, there are six times as
many black AFDC certificate holders as white AFDC certificate
holders who failed to find housing in the Section 8 program.
Disregarding race, one-and-a-half times as many AFDC Section 8's
failed to find housing than did employed section 8's.
(See Appendix G.)
The data in Table 7, which Marsh presented as evidence, was the
same data used by the BHA except that, instead of using percentages,
Marsh made the comparison in terms of sheer numbers. Interestingly,
while the BHA used the data to claim a "success rate" Marsh and the other
advocates pointed out "failures." Although the data remains the same, the
players' conflicting positions are reinforced by the contradictory methods
used to interpret the data.
Table 7
INCOME MIX-SECTION 8 FAILURES
Certificate holder Success Rate Number of failures
AFDC - white 64% 191
AFDC - black 59% 1153
AFDC - Hispanic 65% 246
AFCD - other 35% 37
employed -white 52% 146
employed - black 58% 685
employed - Hispanic 60% 80
employed - other 37% 86
AFDC - total 61% 1427
employed - total 56% 997
Source: Boston Housing Authority
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Thus, in a controversy rooted in conflicting and symbolic frames, the
evidence played a less than significant role in convincing the other side.
The same evidence produced conflicting results when viewed through
conflicting frames.
An Alternate Frame
The framing of the income-mixing proposal led to a controversy that
was nested in a symbolic conflict between "community needs" and the
"needs of certain groups." The proposal that came out of the "community
needs" frame, led to the justification of the "denial of access" to public
housing for groups of people based on income or class. As a result, the
controversy became emotionally charge and no compromise could be
reached. A proposal framed as "enabling" access rather than "denying"
access to the poor could have created less controversy and a better chance
of acceptance. By primarily focusing on getting the unemployed people into
a more economically integrated neighborhood, it might have garnered
more support from the tenants and advocacy groups.
Early on, there was an opportunity to frame the income-mixing
program as one developed to give welfare recipients access into leased
housing units. In his bid to gain support from mayoral candidates Mel
King and Raymond Flynn, Spence had approached both with his income-
mixing proposal.
At the time, King had suggested an alternate proposal in which
choices were given. In this proposal, according to King, an unemployed
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family that was next on the waiting list for public housing but could not get
in due to the 2:1 ratio would have priority to take advantage of the Section 8
subsidies for leased housing, without losing their position on the waiting
list.
"Out of Mel's suggestion," Spence said "we developed this whole
second half of the program, which made a lot of sense... .It [Broad Range of
Incomes Program] would have been an indefensible program as I first
proposed it." 55 Spence did incorporate King's idea into the broad range of
incomes proposal by designating priority for Section 8 subsidies to very low
income families.
However, the broad range of incomes proposal remained
"indefensible" because it was primarily framed as a program that denied
access rather than one that provided access to the very poor. The Section 8
proposal was incorporated as an addition and not as the primary program.
Because the primary message that came out of the broad range of incomes
program was the denial of access, even the Section 8 proposal was rejected
by advocacy groups.
Had the proposal been framed primarily as a means to integrate
welfare recipients into private housing through the Section 8 program, it is
not unimaginable that the same advocacy groups might have supported it.
In fact, the debate would have probably been around issues of private
discrimination in leased housing, with advocates arguing for the rights of
welfare dependents or single mothers to have access to private housing.
55 Ibid.
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Once such support was garnered, the idea of bringing the working poor
(who were still considered very poor by government definition) into public
housing could have been framed as giving access to affordable housing to
people who needed it as much as people on welfare.
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CHAPTER FIVE:
CONCLUSION
The intent of this thesis has been to understand the nature of the
controversy between the BHA and a coalition of advocacy groups regarding the
BHA's attempt to implement an income-mixing program for its public
housing developments. In regard to the nature of the controversy, the findings
are as follows:
I) Opposition to the proposal was a reaction more to the way in which the
BHA's proposal was framed than to the question of economic
integration. The framing of the BHA's proposal as a "community
needs" frame led to the justification of denying public housing access to
groups of people considered to be the most in need. As a result, an
emotional debate grew in which a compromise could not be realized.
II) While the substantive issue underlying the controversy was the
question of who among the poor should live in public housing, the
controversy was played out in a symbolic debate between the
"community need" and the " needs of certain groups" for public
housing.
III) Had the proposal been framed primarily as a means to
integrate welfare recipients and the unemployed through increased
access to private housing, it could have received support from the
same groups who were opposed to the income-mixing proposal.
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The thesis has argued that both the historical background of the
public housing program and the political and economic climate of the early
1980s had a profound effect in shaping the conflicting views between the
BHA and the advocacy groups.
Historically, the way in which the public housing program was
managed meant that certain groups such as single mothers, minorities
and people on welfare were unable to count on the programs initiated by
policy makers in the public housing agencies. This history of
discrimination set the climate for the involvement of various advocacy
groups in the public housing field. The civil rights movement of the sixties
led to an increase in tenant organizations and advocacy groups who
challenged the practices of PHAs.
After the civil rights challenge, integration started to be seen a
greater social good but the method by which it was achieved in public
housing (i.e. setting quotas in order to prevent the "tipping" effect)
discriminated against the same group of people it was trying to help. This
method was seen as a long term solution to contribute to the greater social
good but the immediate rights of the poor were sacrificed in the
implementation, causing further skepticism concerning BHA policies in
the eyes of the advocacy groups.
In the 1960s advocacy groups challenged the BHA's exclusionary
practices and political patronage to establish new rules that increased
access to public housing based on need. Public housing managers were
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resistant to these new rules and changes were not carried out. By the end
of the 70s, BHA faced an economic crisis due to lack of funds and, more
importantly, the tenants were the poorest of all public housing residents in
the country. Because of bad management and financial crisis, the BHA
was put under a court appointed receivership. In the 1980s, the political
and economic climate put further strain on PHAs. There were large
increases in unemployment and homelessness and a drastic reduction of
subsidized housing stock.
In 1983, the BHA proposed an income-mixing strategy for public
housing. Based on past history, advocacy groups tended to be generally
skeptical when the BHA proposed new public housing strategies. This new
strategy based on the mixing of working and non-working poor was, in the
BHA's view, a long term approach to create viable communities in its
public housing developments. The proposal was implicitly framed as a
"community needs" frame. As a result, the BHA felt that it was justified in
denying public housing access to some of the very poor, unemployed, and
those on welfare in the name of the social good. Advocacy groups saw this
as another way of denying access to public housing for the very poor. In
their view, increasing poverty and homelessness demanded that public
housing be reserved for the most needy.
BHA's argument for its income-mixing strategy was organized under a
"larger community needs" frame and viewed the denial of access of certain
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groups as necessary in order to achieve a greater community good. In a
program such as public housing where race, income and class are always
central issues, a strategy that is primarily based on the denial of access,
particularly to the perceived lower-class group, is one that will always create a
controversy nested in an emotional and symbolic battle. This symbolic battle
played itself out, with both sides using persuasive language and the same
evidence to support their arguments. The controversy grew into an
emotionally packed debate that had more to do with the symbolic nature of the
conflict than it did with the underlying issue of who should be housed in public
housing.
Recommendation
In order to avoid such controversies, or at least to minimize the conflict so
that a chance for compromise may exist, housing and community
strategies need to be designed so that all possible conflicting scenarios, and
conflict management strategies be worked out ahead of time. Policy
makers need to frame and formulate their proposals to insure
understanding of the intent. Considering all possible conflicts can also
afford the opportunity to discover any fundamental flaws inherent in
the proposal. Regardless of its anticipated future virtues, it may then be
better to reject the proposal rather than overlook the flaw, particularly
when opposition will come from the people that the program is designed
to help.
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The controversy between the BHA and the advocacy groups was
never resolved. The proposal was rejected by the mayor primarily for
political reasons. But the process did achieve certain results. Tenants and
advocacy groups realized their potential as powerful coalitions, and policy
makers became more aware of the concerns and needs of the tenants
themselves. In that sense, the empowerment of the tenants was achieved.
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Appendix A
POWERS OF THE RECEIVER
It is the intention of the Court, acting pursuant to its general equity
powers, to afford to the Receiver all powers and authority necessary and
available to provide relief to the Plaintiff Class of Tenants. In order
to fulfill his responsibilities, the Receiver shall have full power to
direct, control, manage, administer and operate the property, funds and
staff of the BHA, subject to future orders of the Court. The Receiver
shall take all actions that are necessary or appropriate to conduct and
to direct the ordinary affairs of the BHA. Without limiting the generality
of the foregoing, the Receiver shall exercise all of the powers granted
to or available to the Board (and shall supersede the Board) and to the
Administrator of the BHA pursuant to any statute, rule, regulation, contract,
agreement or grant of authority from any source of authority, and may in
the exercise of the authority granted to him by the Court take the following
actions:
(1) maintain, secure, protect, conserve, modernize, repair, rehabilitate,
redevelop, and improve the property and assets of the BHA, and acquire and
dispose of the same, subject, in the case of acquisition and disposition of
real property, to applicable HUD and DCA regulations and to the prior approval
of the Court;
(2) apply for and accept funds on behalf of the BHA from any public or
private entity or person for any lawful purpose;
(3) contract on behalf of the BHA with any public or private entity
or person for any lawful purpose or to perform, with adequate controls and
monitoring, any function currently or previously performed by the BHA;
(4) take any action or execute any document necessary to comply with
and implement all contracts or agreements with the United States or the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, or any agency or department acting on behalf
thereof, including the United States Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment ("HUD") and the Massachusetts Department of Community Affairs ("DCA"), or
seek and obtain a waiver of any requirement or regulation contained or
incorporated in any such contract or agreement;
(5) carry out all responsibilities assigned to the Board or any member
thereof or other officer of the BHA under any existing resolution authorizing
the sale of bonds or notes and the execution of requisition agreements in
connection therewith;
(6) borrow money for the operations of the BHA and the development,
redevelopment, rehabilitation, modernization, renovation, remodeling,
Source: Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Superior Court, Civil Action No. 17222
Perez v. Boston Housing Authority Order of Appointment of Receiver, February
5, 1980.
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reconstruction, repair, landscaping or improvement of any development or
portion thereof, subject to applicable HUD and DCA regulations and to the
approval of the Court, and pay interest on such loans or debts and any debts
lawfully incurred by or on behalf of the BHA before the effective date
of this Order;
(7) approve corporate records of the BHA and certify actions of the
BHA, by either his own signature or an authorized facsimile thereof, when
necessary to take the place of minutes of the Board;
(8) approve and execute all contracts that the BHA enters into after the
date of this Order;
(9) disaffirm, reject or discontinue at any time any executory or
partially-executed contract, or any severable or divisible portion thereof,
entered into before the date of this Order, including but not limited to
employment, consultant, personal or professional services and materials
contracts, when he finds that the performance of such contract or portion
thereof will impose an undue burden or cost on the BHA, materially interfere
with the achievement of the purposes of this Order, or otherwise not be in
the best interest of the BHA;
(10) direct, supervise and oversee all officers and employees of the BHA;
(11) create, abolish and transfer positions, place positions in grades
and salary levels, establish the compensation for and the duties of such
positions, adopt or amend tables of organization, establish lines of authority
and reporting, and otherwise recognize the structure and responsibilities of the
BHA staff in such ways as he finds will best enable the BHA to carry out its
functions and to achieve the purposes of this Order;
(12) hire, promote, transfer, discipline, suspend or discharge all officers
and employees of the BHA, and establish systems to evaluate periodically the
performance of each officer and employee and to establish and enforce standards
of employee productivity;
(13) procure insurance as necessary to protect the property, assets and
funds of the BHA, subject to applicable HUD and DCA regulations;
(14) file and prosecute suits or commence other legal actions in the
name of and on behalf of the BHA in any appropriate state or federal court,
and commence and prosecute administrative proceedings in the name of and on
behalf of the BHA before any federal, state or city officer, agency or body;
(15) defend, compromise and settle any legal action or administrative
proceeding to which the BHA is a party, or enter into such settlement
agreement in anticipation of litigation or administrative action as he finds
in the best interest of the BHA, but neither the Receiver nor the BHA shall be
subject to any legal action or administrative proceeding of any nature for
acts performed by the Receiver except as expressly provided in this Order;
(16) disaffirm, reject, discontinue, amend, revise, or rescind any
internal rule, regulation, bylaw, policy, custom or practice of the BHA,
when he finds that such action will materially improve the BHA's capacity
to achieve the purposes of this Order;
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(17) delegate to any officer or employee of the BHA or any agent of the
Receiver any power granted to the Receiver pursuant to this Order or any
provision of the law;
(18) contract for such legal, accounting, professional or consultant
services furnished directly to the Receiver as he finds necessary for the
performance of his duties, subject to the prior approval of the Court, and
direct the BHA to pay the costs therefor;
(19) take any action that he finds necessary and proper for the achieve-
ment of the purposes of this Order or the exercise of any of the foregoing
powers.
Appendix B
BOSTON HOUSING AUTHORITY
52 Chauncy Street
Boston, Massachusetts 02111 617-451-1250
October 25, 1983
Mr. John Mongan
Regional Administrator
U.S. Department of Housing
and Urban Development
J.F.K. Federal Building
Boston, MA 02203
ATTENTION: Stanley Sigel
RE: Broad Range Of Incomes Program For The Boston
Housing Authority
Dear Mr. Mongan:
I am writing to describe and request HUD
authorization to proceed with BHA's proposed broad
range of incomes program for its family developments.
As you know, the United States Housing Act requires
housing authorities to establish tenant selection
criteria "designed to assure that, within a reasonable
period of time, the project will include families with
a broad range of incomes and will avoid concentrations
of lower income and deprived families with serious
social problems..." 42 U.S.C. 1437d. The Senate
Committee responsible for the act which contained this
provision stated that ". . .the Committee expects that
in the long run we would have more housing developments
which are not occupied solely by the very poor...
Experience has demonstrated that a cross-section of
occupancy is an essential ingredient in creating
economically viable housing as well as a healthy
social environment..." Sen. Rept. No. 93-693, 1974
U.S. Code Congressional & Administrative News, p. 4311.
In Boston, a number of family public housing
developments are occupied almost solely by the very poor.
Residents of these developments are almost totally
isolated from others in our society whose opportunities
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John Mongan
October 25, 1983
and outlook give them reasonable hopes and prospects
for the future. This situation reduces the chances
that residents, particularly teenagers and young
adults, will acquire the attitudes and opportunities
needed to become successful. In addition, some of the
common by-products of a lack of purpose for the present
or hope for the future, notably additional crime,
disorder, vandalism and disinterest in property
conditions, clearly have contributed to deterioration
at BHA developments and thus to the need for receiver-
ship. The concentration of very poor families at BHA
developments also results in lower rent rolls and
more dependence on operating subsidies.
Accordingly, BHA has developed a broad range of
incomes strategy which aims at achieving, at each
family development, a range of incomes within HUD's
permissible low income limits. BHA's family incomes
presently are concentrated at the very lowest end
of HUD's permissible range--69% of households have
incomes below 25% of the area median income as
established by HUD in 1983. BHA, therefore, generally
will establish a two-tier system, with the tiers
defined by incomes reflecting 25% of the area median
for each household size. The ratios for selecting
applicants from each tier may differ among developments
and change over time, according to the income
distribution of tenants within each development, but
the ultimate goal will be a 50% representation in
each tier. Any priorities offered applicants as part
of this program, however, will be subordinate to
priorities and plans in effect for the promotion,
achievement or maintenance of racial integration.
With respect to BHA's elderly developments,
application of such a strategy would not have the same
constructive effect, and thus, unnecessarily would
result in excessive delay in meeting the housing needs
of very low income elderly persons or families.
Therefore, BHA requests HUD's concurrence, contemplated
by the statute, that these efforts need not be applied
to its elderly developments.
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Recent statutory amendments and related
ongressional pronouncements, not yet reflected in
regulations, have clarified that the broad range of
incomes policy is not to result in a priority for applicants
whose incomes exceed 50% of the area median. Since very
few (less than 5%) of BHA's applicants have incomes which
exceed this level, the proposed program will not have such
an effect. Of course, BHA will comply with any future
regulations on this subject.
BHA's broad range of incomes proposal could be
implemented under the present language of part V.B.4. of
its Tenant Selection and Assignment Plan (TSAP),
previously approved by HUD, which allows special priority
categories to be established for individual developments.
For clarification, however, BHA proposes TSAP changes
which specifically authorize such a program.
While the implementation of the broad range of
incomes program is essential to the well-being of BHA's
family developments, the shortage of rental housing for
Boston's very low-income families obviously remains a
concern. BHA's substantial efforts to rehabilitate and
reoccupy its developments, which in some cases involve
the rehabilitation of units which have been vacant ten
years or more, will help to alleviate this situation.
In addition, under separate cover the BHA is proposing
changes to its Section 8 existing housing program, which
will assist further by providing priority in that program
for very low income and emergency applicants to public
housing. Similar changes are proposed for the State's
leased housing program.
The proposed TSAP language, actual broad range of incomes
proposal and pertinent background data are included. Your
review of this material is appreciated. Please call me
immediately if you have questions or comments.
Si /ely, --
4eis 4 <p nce
Receiv / inistrator
LHS/jb
Enclosures
cc: Amy Anthony, Secretary, EOCD
Leslie Newman, Esq., GBLS (Counsel for plaintiff class, Perez
v. BHA)
NTcxNibi, Director, Office of Housing, HUD
Ken Salk, Director, Housing Management, HUD
James Hamrock, Chief of Assisted Housing Management Branch, HI
Joseph Vera, Acting Director, Regional Office of FHEO, HUD
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Bulfincn Building. 15 New Charoon Street
Boston, Massacnusetts 02114
8E 1983
Lewis H. Spence
Receiver/Administrator
Boston Housing Authority
52 Chauncy Street
Boston, MA 02111
Subject: Broad Range of Income
Dear Mr. Spence:
In response to your letter, dated October 5, 1983, relative
to the above subject, please be advised that we approve your
proposed amendments to the Tenant Selection, Assignment and
Transfer Plan which authorizes the BHA to undertake its proposed
broad range of income program. This will allow the BHA to pro-
ceed with its proposal to create income tiers and admit appli-
cants in a manner designed to achieve broad range of incomes at
its family developments.
If this office can be of any further assistance, contact
Stanley Sigel, Housing Management Officer, at 223-4209.
Sincerely,, /
INheth H. Salk, Director
Ho'sing Management Division
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BOSTON HOUSING AUTHORITY
52 Chauncy Street
Boston. Massachusetts 02111 617-451-1250
April 23, 1984
Mr. Langley Keyes
Executive Office of Communities
and Development
100 Cambridge Street
Boston, MA
Dear Lang:
Enclosed are two tables which indicate the success rates
for Section 8 Certificate holders:
1) By race and income source; and
2) By race and unit size.
The data is, I hope, self-explanatory. You will note that there
does not appear to be any bias against AFDC recipients in finding
units. In fact, AFDC recipients have a higher success rate than do
employed Certificate holders.
You will note, however, that SSI recipients have the lowest
success rate of any of the income source groups. This is not
surprising to me in light of the special problems associated with
SSI recipients. Regarding bedroom size, somewhat surprisingly, there
is not a really clear pattern evident in the data. In fact, I initially
believed that these statistics were incorrect, simply on the basis that
4-bedroom white families have a higher success rate than 1-bedroom white
families. However, we have rechecked all of the numbers and I believe
they are accurate.
Please let me know if you need any clarification or additional
information. We very much appreciated the forum which you provided
for the BHA to explain the broad range of incomes policy and are hopeful
that EOCD approval will be forthcoming.
Sincerely,
Joh Washek
Exe utive Assistant to the ReceivE
JW/jm
Attachments
cc: Lewis H. Spence, Receiver/Administrator
bcc: John Stainton, Deputy Administrator
Rod Solomon, General Counsel
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TABLE I
DISTRIBUTION OF SECTION 8 CERTIFICATE HOLDERS
BY RACE AND INCOME SOURCE
(SUCCESS RATES ARE INDICATED IN PARENTHESES)
Income Source White Black Hispanic
AFDC
Employed
Soc.Sec./Retired
SSI
General Relief
Multi Source
Other
Total
340
(64%)
159
(52%)
350
50%)
103
(42%)
24
(42%)
451
(57%)
41
(71%)
1468
(56%)
1659
(59%)
947
(58%)
110
(56%)
72
(43%)
70
(69%)
473
(54%)
181
(86%)
3512
(59%)
457
(65%)
121
(60%)
12
(33%)
28
(64%)
14
(43%)
124
(61%)
12
(50%)
768
(62%)
20
(35%)
51
(37%)
12
(67%)
2
(50%)
2
(50%)
20
(45%)
2476
(61%)
1278
(56%)
484
(52%)
205
(45%)
110
(59%)
1068
(56%)
2 236
(100%) (82%)
109
(43%)
5857
(59%)
77
Other TotalBlack Hisnanic Other otal
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DISTRIBUTION OF SECTION 8 CERTIFICATE HOLDERS
(SUCCESS
BY RACE AND UNIT SIZE
RATES ARE INDICATED IN PARENTHESES)
Unit Size
0-1
Total
White
722
(50%)
456
(60%)
235
(64%)
55
(55%)
1468
(56%)
Black
261
(65%)
1626
(61%)
1226
(59%)
399
(51%)
3512
(59%)
Hispanic
34
(53%)
261
(61%)
335
(64%)
138
(61%)
768
(62%)
78
Other
20
(70%)
35
(42%)
40
(28%)
15
(47%)
109
(43%)
Total
1037
(54%)
2378
(61%)
1835
(60%)
607
(53%)
5857
(59%)
ExECUTIVE Appendix E
OFFICE OFCOMMUNITES &
DEVEOPMENT
I Michael S. Dukakis, GovernorAmy S. Anthony, Secretary
May 14, 1984
Lewis H. Spence
Receiver/Administrator
Boston Housing Authority
52 Chauncy Street
Boston, MA 02111
Re: Proposal for "Broad Range of Incomes" Program
Dear Mr. Spence:
I am writing in regard to the proposal made by the Boston Housing Authority
to implement a "Broad Range of Incomes" program in the Authority's family
public housing developments.
It is my understanding that the Authority proposes these changes and
has submitted them to us for our approval based upon several considerations:
-- The Authority has concluded that occupancy at several of its
family developments almost solely by very poor households is
not a desirable long-term situation and that the Authority
should adopt a policy promoting a "Broad Range of Incomes"
within its public housing developments.
-- The Authority has received approval from the U.S. Department
of Housing and Urban Development to implement such a "Broad
Range of Incomes" program in its federal family public housing
developments (which constitutes 79% of the total units in all
the BHA's family public housing developments).
-- At the same time, the Authority intends to amend its tenant
selection procedures under its rental assistance programs to
provide priority to those of very low income and to emergency
situations; approval for such a change under the federal rental
assistance program (Section 8) has already been obtained from
HUD.
Office of the Secretary
100 Cambridge Street, Room 1404
Boston, Massachusetts 02202
(617) 727-7765
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Lewis H. Spence
Receiver/Administrator
Page 2
May 14, 1984
-- The Authority believes that it can work to ensure an acceptable
success rate in the utilization of its rental assistance
programs for those of very low income (particularly, large
families); recent experience at the BHA indicates that potentially
vulnerable groups (low income, families on AFDC, large families,
or minorities) have success rates equal to or better thAn the
total pool of eligible applicants.
EOCD has serious concerns about the potential impact of the BHA proposal.
While the "Broad Range of Incomes" program might improve certain aspects of
the public housing developments involved, it is critical that such a policy
not discriminate against very low income applicants to the BHA, particularly
welfare recipients.
Based upon your presentation, however, we have concluded that your
proposed policy could be implemented so as not to adversely affect those low
income applicants to the Boston Housing Authority, provided that certain
actions are taken by the BHA. EOCD's approval therefore is conditional upon
the following:
(1) The establishment of a priority system for very low income
households for the Section 8 and Chapter 707 rental assistance
programs, with clear guidelines as to how the specific mechanics
of such a system would work and how it is to be made compatible
with other priorities (such as emergency status) and waiting
lists.
(2) Development of a program to provide support and assistance for
households granted a Section 8 or Chapter 707 certificates in
finding an apartment, so as to ensure successful utilization of
these programs.
(3) Development of a plan, submitted to EOCD, for the development of
Chapter 705 and Chapter 689 housing which demonstrates the use
of those programs by the BHA to increase the overall stock of
public housing for large families and households with special
needs.
EOCD approves the proposed change at such time as the BHA certifies that
it is in compliance with the above conditions, as follows:
(1) The proposed amendment to the TSAP regarding Section XVII, "Broad
Range of Income Criteria" shall include a sentence which reads:
"Such criteria, insofar as they relate to state-aided developments,
shall be subject to the review and approval of Executive Office of
Communities and Development."
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Lewis H. Spence
Receiver/Administrator
Page 3
May 14, 1984
(2) EOCD is willinq to approve the proposed "criteria" outlined in
the BHA's Proposal for a "Broad Range of Income" program
(included in your letter of October 25, 1983), with the following
addition:
"(10) The BHA will monitor the impact of the broad range
of incomes program, particularly with regard to potantially
vulnerable groups (AFDC recipients, large families,
minorities), and will report regularly (at least quarterly)
to EOCD as to what those impacts are. If at any time there
is an indication that potentially vulnerable groups are
suffering substantially adverse impacts as a result of the
implementation of the broad range of incomes program, EOCD
may require modifications to such program."
In addition, while not a condition of our approval, EOCD urges that the
BHA: (1) develop a timetable for implementation of the "Broad Range of Incomes"
program which considers equity issues towards those who have been on the waiting
list for years and for whom the abrupt imposition of a 2 to 1 ratio precludes
the likelihood of access to a BHA development, recognizing the need to develop
a careful process and timetable for transition from the old system to the new
one; and (2) develop a priority system for Tier II households which gives
recognition and weighting to families that have moved off of public assistance
programs and into jobs (particularly as a result of involvement in publicly-
sponsored employment or training programs.)
It is our hope that the BHA will be able to develop and implement a "Broad
Range of Incomes" program which, in conjunction with other actions to be taken
by the Authority, will not adversely impact very low income applicants to the
Authority.
Sin/crely,
S. An hony '
.. Sereta'ry
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CITY OF BOSTON - MASSACHUSETTS,
OFFICE OF THE MAYOR
RAYMOND L. FLYNN
May 29, 1984
Secretary Amy Anthony
Executive Office of Communities andDevelopment
100 Cambridge St.
Boston, MA 02202
Oear Secretary Anthony:
It is my understanding that the Boston Housing Authority (BHA) is requesting
changes .n the tenant selection regulations to allow income to he used as a criterion
for selecting eligible tenants. Currently, tne BHA policy is based on eligible
residents receiving priority based upon date of application, with certain exceptions
(e.g. emergencies, racial balance). The proposed policy would change this policy in
order to creater a broader range of household incomes.
My Administration is committed to developing a comprehensive approach to
providing new housing options for low- and moderate- income households, while at
the same time affording protections to current residents against displacement and
poor living conditions. In terms of the Administration's commitment to public
housing residents, we are committed to providing adequate city services to BHA
residents and supporting in any way possible the efforts of the Receiver, so we may
begin an orderly transition process of responsibility back to the City.
In light of the current housing crisis in the City, particularly ,s 't on
low-income residents, I find it difficult to support the proposed BHA tenrant
selection policy. As you know, there is a severe housing shortage in the City,
particularly for low-income residents. The current BHA waiting list of over 6,000
eligible families is an indication of the severity of the problem in the private
housing market.
502 IYHAL-OEC'HL LZ2 BEC'2SACEET
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Letter to Secretary Amy Anthony
May 29, 1984
Page Two
When the housing supply in the City is expanded and can provide more access
and opportunities for the very low-income population, the proposed BHA policy may
be a viable option. But under current housing conditions, I believe that such a policy
may not best serve the interests of both low-income people and the broader
communily. While I understand the reasoning that went into the design of this
policy, especially the desire to seek stability in public housing commui-ties by
serving a more diverse population, I believe that this can be accomplished best
through other means. Specifically, I would hope to see expanded job-training and
employment opportunities for current public housing residents. I applaud and
strongly support efforts to increase support services in the area of education,
training, employment, and community-building activities which have been a major
part of rebuilding public housing in our City.
Perhaps it would be possible to work out some "pilot" program to test the
potential benefits of BHA income-mixing in one or two developments. I am certain
that the Receiver can develop an innovative plan that would allow such a test of the
proposed policy without jeopordizing the housing opportunities for very low-income
people.
The task of serving the housing needs of our neediest citizens is indeed a
difficult one. I believe that, working together, we can achieve the goals of
increasing the housing supply and providing greater economic opportunities for
public housing residents, without depriving the neediest of scarce housing resources.
Thank you for your attention to this important concern.
_.,ncerely,
' RayfnondL.Flynn /m
Mayor
RLF/dp 02140
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FA \IIL
SER\ICE
A5SOCLATIO\
OF GREATER
BOSTON
May 29, 1984
Lewis H. Spence
Receiver/Administrator
Boston Housing Authority
52 Chauncy Street
Boston, MA 02111
Dear Mr. Spence:
As a housing advocate working primarily with homeless and near-homeless
individuals and families who receive public assistance as their sole source
of income, I have grave misgivings regarding the recently approved IHA
tenant selection policy change. I feel that the impact of this change upon
the very low income members of the community has not been adequately assessed.
I feel that the information provided by the BHA (in a letter to the
Executive Office of Communities and Development, from John Washek) gives an
imcomplete picture of the problems faced by Section 8 certificate holders,
particularly those who are public assistance recipients. I have looked at
Mr. Washek's data in terms of the number of certificate holders who fail
to find housing, and I am very troubled by the large number of unsuccessful
AFDC recipients, particularly those who are black and Hispanic. According
to Mr. Washek's figures, there are six times as many black AFDC certificate
holders as white AFDC certificate holders who failed to find housing in the
Section 8 program. Disregarding race, one-and-a-half t-imes as manY AFDC
Section 's failed to find housing than did employed Section 8's.
Moreover, the Boston Fair Housing Commission found that far more
black Section 8 certificate holders failed to find housing chan did white
Section 8 certificate holders. According to the Commission report, there
were 384Z more blacks than whites who failed to find housing under the
Section 8 program.
It is critical that any modification in the distribution of public
housing units and Section 8 certificates should consider the aboveoutlined
problems. A Section 8 certificate, unlike a place in public housing, is not
a guarantee of shelter. For some groups, there is even less certainty.
I believe that the information BHA has provided has not indicated these
problems to the extent that is warrented. I hope that the attached analysis
remedies this situation in part.
Sincerely,
Center for Advocacy Sue Marsh
34V Beacon Street Housing Advocate
Boston.MA 02103
(617) 523-640
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INCOME HIX -- SECTION 8 FAILURES
Certificate holder
AFDC - white
AFDC - black
AFDC - Hispanic
AFDC - other
employed - white
employed - black
employed - Hispanic
employed - other
Success rate
64%
59%
65%
35%
52%
58Z
60%
37%
Number of failures
191
1153
.246
37
146
685
30
86
AFDC - total
employed - total
61%
56%
1427
997
85
Bibliography
Bassuk, Ellen L. "The Homeless Problem," in The Welfare Debate, ed. Robert
Emmet Long. New York: The H.W. Wilson Company Press, 1989.
Bauer, Catherine. "The Dreary Deadlock of Public Housing," in Federal Housing
Policy and Programs: Past and Present, ed. J. Paul Mitchell. New
Brunswick: The State University of New Jersey Press, 1985.
Cole, Mary S. "Chatherine Bauer and the Public Housing Movement, 1926-1937."
Ph.D. diss., The George Washington University, 1975.
Friedman, Lawrence M. Government and Slum Housing: A Century of
Frustration. Chicago: Rand McNally & Company Press, 1968.
Garland, Susan B. "Welfare Reform May Finally Be in the Works," in The
Welfare Debate. ed. Robert Emmet Long. New York: The H.W. Wilson
Company Press, 1989.
Hipshman, May. Public Housing at the crossroads: The Boston Public Housing
Authority. Boston: Citizens Housing and Planning Association, 1967.
Housing Policy Statement for Massachusetts, The Executive Office of
Communities and Development, 1975.
Kolodny, Robert. Exploring New Strategies for Improving Public Housing
Management. Washington D.C.: Department of Housing and Urban
Development, 1979.
Kozol, Jonathan. "Distancing the Homeless", in The Welfare Debate, ed. Robert
Emmet Long. New York: The H.W. Wilson Company Press, 1989.
Long, Robert E., "Background: Welfare and the Reagan Presidency," in The
Welfare Debate, ed. Robert Emmet Long. New York: The H.W. Wilson
Company Press, 1989.
Maloney, Lawrence D. "Welfare in America: Is It a Flop?," in The Welfare, ed.
Robert Emmet Long. New York: The H.W. Wilson Company Press, 1989.
Meehan, Eugene J. Public Housing Policy. New Brunswick: Center for
Urban Policy Research, Rutgers University, 1975.
Mitchell, Paul J. "The Historical Context for Housing Policy," in Federal
Housing Policy and Programs: Past and Present, ed. J. Paul Mitchell. New
Brunswick: The State University of New Jersey Press, 1985.
86
Pynoos, Jon. Breaking the Rules: Bureaucracy and Reform in Public Housing.
New York: Plenum Press, 1986.
Rein, Martin, The fact-Value Dilemma. Cambridge: Joint Center for Urban
Studies of MIT and Harvard University, 1974.
Ryan, William. Blaming the Victim. New York: Pantheon Books Press, 1971.
Scobie, Richard S. Problem Tenants in Public Housing: Who, Where, and Why
Are They? New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975.
Shister, Jayne E. "The Strategy of Tenant Selection in Cambridge Public
Housing," Master's Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1976.
Scott, Esther. "The Boston Housing Authority," a case study prepared at the
Kennedy School of Government, 1983.
Turner, Margery Austin and Raymond J. Struyk. Urban Housing in the 1980s:
Markets and Policies. Washington D.C.: The Urban Institute Press, 1984.
Weiss, Marc A. "The Origins and Legacy of Urban Renewal," in Federal Housing
Policy and Programs: Past and Present, ed. J. Paul Mitchell. New
Brunswick: The State University of New Jersey, 1985.
Rein, Martin and Donald A. Schon. Frame-reflective policy discourse.
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Photocopy.
Robins, Ira S. and Gus Tyler. Reminiscences of a Housing Advocate. New York:
Citizens Housing and Planning Council, 1984.
"The Boston Housing Authority: The Receivership," Kennedy School of
Government Case Study, 1985.
News Articles
"BHA Backs off from 'gentrification' policy," Boston Business Journal,
July 16, 1984.
"BHA Tenants want the receivership extended," The Boston Globe,
February 23, 1984.
"Can this man save public housing? The Boston Housing Authority's Harry
Spence" The Boston Globe, August 23, 1981
"Is Harry Spence God? Or Is He Just Damn Good?" Boston Magazine,
December 1981.
87
"Housing Boston's poor," The Boston Globe, April 26, 1984.
"Housing guidelines protested," The Boston Globe, April, 25, 1984.
"Public Housing: A HUD study says that public housing is rapidly becoming the
nation's 'female ghetto'," Equal Times, Boston, March 13, 1983.
"Wrong way to select tenants,"The Boston Globe, April 26, 1984.
Interviews
Boston Housing Authority:
Lewis (Harry) Spence, former Receiver, March 1991.
Rod Solomon, Legal Department, Boston Housing Authority, March 1991.
Executive Office of Communities and Development:
Ann O'Hara, Assistant Secretary, Housing Division, December, 1990.
Scott Hebert, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Housing Division, December,
1990.
Franklin Hill Housing Development:
Anna Cole, Tenant Manager and resident, April, 1991.
John F. Kennedy School of Government
William Apgar, Professor
Massachusetts Tenant Organization:
Maryann Martorana, Vice President, April, 1991.
Lizbeth Heyer, Staff, December, 1990.
88
